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CONTENTS

25 November 1991

BULGARIA

Biographies of New Government Ministers [DEMOKRATSIYA 9 Nov]	1
Towns Affected by Declining Defense Industry [DUMA 9 Oct]	3

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Argument in Favor of Sovereign Slovak Republic [LITERARNY TYZDENNIK 27 Sep]	5
Common State Seen Must for Economic Success [LIDOVE NOVINY 23 Oct]	6
Economic Importance of Federation's Survival [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 3, 10, 17 Oct]	8
Private Farmer's Income Tax Composition Explained [ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY 16 Oct]	14

HUNGARY

FIDESZ Critical of President, SZDSZ [MAGYAR NARANCS 9 Oct]	19
MDF Parliamentary Leader Causes New 'Storm' [MAGYAR HIRLAP 29 Oct]	20
Miners Trade Union, MSZP Agree To Cooperate [NEPSZABADSAG 29 Oct]	20
Sanatorium for Chernobyl Children Opposed [MAGYAR HIRLAP 4 Nov]	21

POLAND

Commentary Calls For Continuing Economic Reforms [PRAWO I ZYCIE 2 Nov]	22
Mitsubishi Corporation Visits Poland [RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Oct]	23
POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 20-26 Oct 91 [26 Oct]	23

ROMANIA

Recent Focus on Irredentism Government Diversion [ROMANIA LIBERA 24 Oct]	25
Miners Distrust FSN, Prefer United Opposition [ROMANIA LIBERA 23 Oct]	26
Living Conditions of Miners in Jiu Valley [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER 6 Oct]	29
Army Allegedly To Liquidate Dangerous Elements [ROMANIA LIBERA 23 Oct]	30

Biographies of New Government Ministers

92P20059A Sofia DEMOKRATIYA in Bulgarian
9 Nov 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: "New People From Whom We Expect Change"]

[Text]

Stanislav Dimitrov, Minister of Agriculture

—"We will energetically carry out agricultural reform. We will decisively enforce the provisions of the Law on Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land."

Stanislav Dimitrov was born on 19 June 1926 in Sofia. He graduated from the High School for Boys No. 2 and studied at the law department of Sofia University. He worked first as a lawyer and then, beginning on 1 September 1954, served as a legal consultant in the central directorate of the State Insurance Institute. He returned to legal practice in 1960.

He did not belong to any political party until he joined the Democratic Party. He is at present a member of its Executive Bureau.

He is married and has a daughter and two grandchildren.

He is at present a lawyer at the Lawyers Collective No. 2 in Sofia.

Aleksandur Aleksandrov, Minister of Transportation

—"I hope to modernize the structure in order to improve things gradually."

Aleksandur Aleksandrov was born on 11 November 1952 in Sofia. He completed his secondary education at the Technical School for Automation in Sofia in 1971. In 1978 he graduated from the Transport Department of the Higher Mechanical-Electrical Engineering Institute in Sofia. He worked at Kremikovtzi, Peshtoremontstroy, and the Elektra factory. Subsequently, he worked as a designer and researcher in the "efficiency" office of the harbor administration at the Transproekt Institute. From 1985 to May 1991, he served as the chief designer at the same institute. On 28 May 1991, he was appointed chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Poduyane township council in Sofia. On 25 October 1991, he was elected deputy mayor of Sofia.

In the period 1982-84, he did his postgraduate work at the Higher Economic Institute, specializing in the economics, organization, and administration of automotive transportation.

He is married and has two daughters.

He is a member of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party. He is not a member of the National Assembly. He is at present serving as deputy mayor of Sofia.

Stoyan Ganev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs

—"National interests and national security are not matters for just one party or coalition; they concern the entire nation."

Stoyan Ganev was born on 23 July 1955 in Pazardzhik. In 1969 he graduated from the High School for Mathematics with highest honors, and in 1973 he completed his studies in law at Sofia University. In 1985 he defended his dissertation on constitutional law at Moscow University. He has taught constitutional law at Sofia University since 1985.

He is chairman of the United Democratic Center, a former cochairman of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] parliamentary group, and a representative for the SDS in the 36th National Assembly.

Nikolay Vasilev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Education and Science

—"Serious consultations with experts from all fields must be undertaken in order to create the guidelines and structures of the Ministry, after which we will see what we have inherited."

Nikolay Vasilev was born on 21 June 1946 in Smolyan. In 1971 he graduated from the St. Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia with a degree in philosophy. Since 1974 he has taught philosophy and anthropology at Sofia University. He received his doctorate in philosophy in 1988 and has been a professor of philosophy since 1990. He was a member of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] from 1975 until 1987, when he was expelled. He has been chairman of the ASP [Alternative Socialist Party] since 11 February 1990. He is the author of six books and 250 studies, articles, and other publications. He is a member of the academic council of Sofia University and deputy director of the National Institute for Research on Social Change.

Svetoslav Luchnikov, Minister of Justice

—"The program will be to promote competent laws and administer justice objectively and fairly."

Svetoslav Luchnikov was born on 3 February 1922 in Ruse. He was orphaned early in life. He graduated from high school in Ruse in 1940 and studied at the law department in Sofia. He became an assistant professor. In 1949 he was dismissed for political reasons. At first he worked in unskilled jobs but later held positions as a legal consultant and chief economist at the Center for Innovation at the State Committee for Science and Technical Progress.

In the fall of 1990, he was made a member of the Council for Normative Legislation at the Council of Ministers. He participated in the drafting of numerous laws. In 1991 he was one of the coauthors of the draft constitution submitted by the Radical Democratic party. He is

currently a lecturer on commercial law at the Free University. He is married and has a child and a grandchild.

Elka Konstantinova, Minister of Culture

—"I will spare no effort to find resources for cultural matters. The current state of culture is tragic and humiliating. I will endeavor to help all talented people, regardless of their political affiliations."

Elka Konstantinova was born on 26 March 1932 into a family of intellectuals. She is a senior scientific assistant and a doctor of philology. She is the director of the Section for the History of Bulgarian Literature (postliberation) at the Literature Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. She is the author of more than 20 books and monographs in the fields of Bulgarian literary history and modern Bulgarian literature. She has a working knowledge of French and Russian.

She is chairman of the Radical Democratic Party and a representative in the 36th National Assembly.

Vekil Vanov, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare

—"First of all, I will work on the problem of unemployment, for which a solution must be found."

Vekil Vanov was born on 17 October 1937. He graduated from the Higher Economic Institute, where he specialized in industrial economics. Until September 1973, he worked as a scientific assistant at the Scientific Research Institute for Economic Planning. Thereafter, he worked at the Economic Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. In 1982, he defended his dissertation, "Quantitative and Qualitative Changes in the Structure of Professional Qualifications of Workers in Bulgaria." Since 1973 he has been concerned with manpower resources and the effective use of labor. He is at present working on problems of unemployment and social assistance for the socially disadvantaged. He was elected to the 36th National Assembly on the SDS ticket.

Valentin Vasilev, Minister of Environmental Protection

—"I will tell the Bulgarian people honestly what the ecological situation is in the country and what we are able to do and what we cannot do, given our critical economic conditions."

Valentin Vasilev is married and has two daughters. He has two advanced degrees. In 1978 he graduated from the Higher Institute for Architecture and Construction and later from the Journalism Department of the St. Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia. He has worked on environmental protection for 16 years as a hydrologist. For the past six months, he has directed a program on ecology for Bulgarian radio and television. He is extremely knowledgeable about the ecological situation in the country and the reasons for its present state.

Ivan Pushkarov, Minister of Industry and Trade [as published]

—"Let us do what we have been prevented from doing up to now."

Ivan Pushkarov was born on 1 December 1938 in the village of Chelopech in the Sofia region. He graduated from the Higher Economic Institute in 1964. He is a senior scientific associate and a candidate of economic sciences.

He was a member of the BCP from 1968 until his expulsion from the party in 1973.

He is currently a member of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party. He was elected to the 36th National Assembly on the SDS ticket. He has been minister of industry, trade, and services up to now.

Nikola Vasilev, Minister of Health Care

—"Medicine and dentistry should be free professions, and health care should be available to citizens."

Nikola Vasilev was born on 16 November 1949 in Sofia. He received his secondary and college education in Sofia. He is a doctor, specializing in pathology, anatomy, obstetrics, and gynecology. He has worked at various hospitals throughout the country. He has an advanced degree in medicine. He is an associate professor at the Institute for Obstetrics and Gynecology in Sofia. He was deputy minister of health in the previous government. He is married and has two children. He does not belong to any political party.

Dimitur Ludzhev, Minister of Defense

—"The draft law on the Ministry of Defense is being prepared. A number of structural changes are under way that will affect the Ministry, the Armed Forces, and the intelligence services."

Dimitur Ludzhev was born on 27 March 1950 in Burgas. In 1973 he completed his studies in political economy and sociology at the economic institute in Sofia. He is a senior scientific associate at the Historical Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. He is married and has two children. He was a member of the Club for Glasnost and Democracy, now called the "Club for Democracy," and served as a minister in the previous government. He was elected to the 36th National Assembly on the SDS ticket.

Yordan Sokolov, Minister of Internal Affairs

—"Professionalism will be the primary requirement for bringing about change in the present system in the Ministry of Interior."

Yordan Sokolov was born on 18 January 1933 in Sofia.

He graduated with honors from the High School for Boys No. 1 in 1950. In 1956, he got a law degree with honors. He worked as a secretary at the state arbitration office

and, in 1958, became an attorney. He has been a member of the lawyers' council. He was a member of the Central Electoral Commission for the 1990 elections. Since 1990, he has served as a nongovernmental adviser to the president on legal matters. He has never been a member of any political party.

He is married and has two daughters.

Ivan Kostov, Minister of Finance

—"We will continue the reform, this time thoroughly and rapidly."

Ivan Kostov was born in Sofia in 1949. He is a graduate of the Higher Economic Institute at St. Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia and has a degree in mathematics. He is a candidate in economics. He has taught at a higher educational institute. He is currently minister of finance. He does not belong to a political party. He was elected to the 36th National Assembly on the SDS ticket. He is married and has two daughters.

Nikola Karadimov, Minister of Regional Development, Housing Policy, and Construction

—"The first tasks in construction are demonopolization, decentralization, and privatization."

Nikola Karadimov was born in 1942 in Plovdiv. He graduated from the Department of Architecture of the VIAS [Higher Institute of Architecture and Construction] in 1967. He worked for nine years as a designer of industrial, residential, educational, and medical buildings. He subsequently worked as a chief expert on residential and public buildings on the Supreme Council on Construction. He has won architectural prizes. In 1987 he joined the Ministry of Construction, Architecture, and Public Works, where he has served successively as a director, a chief director, and chief of the Department for Strategic Planning and Housing Programs. He is a representative on the working group for housing problems on the Economic Commission for Europe. He is a member of the Union of Architects. He has never belonged to a political party.

He is married and has two children.

Towns Affected by Declining Defense Industry

92BA0064A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 9 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Krasimir Tsigularov and Nikolay Golemanov: "Plants Built Cities in Roman and Cherven Bryag; Today They May Devastate Them"]

[Text] The signposts of the spacious bus station of the Beta Firm (previously the 9th of May Plant) in Cherven Bryag indicate the terminal points of the routes. There are 29 of them, not counting the city itself. Twenty-nine settlements delineating territory of not less than 500-600 sq km in three former okrugs. This was probably the liveliest bus terminal in the entire region, operating

around the clock in spite of the administrative hitches in work-force traffic. Today only the breezes of hope blow there....

In Roman, the Steel Wire and Cable Plant is jammed with unsold output worth 12 million leva. It is expected to close in at least three months. And this—after the Vietnamese have left, after the workers who had come from dozens of km began, one after another, to look with suspicions and skepticism on the land inherited from their forefathers.

Both cities are now settlements. First the railroad line passed by. Then came the stations; with them, work; and, after the work, houses sprang up one after the other. All around lies mostly dry, stony land that hardly sufficed before for the inhabitants of the neighboring villages. Sometime in the 1960's and the 1970's, the attempt to halt the migration to the large cities brought in the large plants. Constructed on a scope incompatible with the region's resources, year after year they continued building and expanding the cities. Now in the industrial regions there reign despondency and bewilderment. Are the plants on the way out?

More than 2,000 persons were needed to work at the plant in Roman. Nearly 9,000 even now call the Beta Firm their workplace. In practice, the numbers are almost half the population of the cities and probably considerably more than half of the able-bodied population. There is no other industrial base in Roman. It is almost the same in Cherven Bryag. There at least they have the 5th Ward—the Gypsy quarter that has brought together the elite of pickpockets and some of "the Republic's record holders" for robberies. There is no alternative but for everybody to become a pickpocket.

"Beta is the structure-determining firm for the obshtina; it creates not only the bulk of the budget but also the people's employment, income, and social status," Deputy General Director Petur Petrov asserts. "That is why the question of conversion is highly important now."

It goes without saying that conversion is no easy matter. In 1989, the firm's civilian production was barely 2.7 percent. In 1990, it reached 11 percent. Worldwide experience indicates that the rate of conversion can hardly exceed 5 of 6 percent annually. Again, world experience indicates that civilian production in such plants should account for about 70 percent, and military production for the remaining 30 percent. One can easily calculate at what rate conversion should take place, with what resources, and in how much time. Until quite recently, nobody had thought about this. On the contrary, the state's demands for the production of armored vehicles and equipment by far exceeded the capabilities of the largest machine-building enterprise in northern Bulgaria and was as great as several thousand individual items.

The recommendations of our experts and of Western experts, as well, have been to preserve part of the

military production. For the present, seven versions of armored means have been preserved and are in production. Actually, the facilities cannot be used for anything else. Only part of the equipment can be and is already being used for civilian production.

Candidate for deputy Eng. Tosho Mukhtanov (fourth on the BSP Pleven list) had 12 years at Beta before becoming a Council of Ministers counselor. He sees good possibilities of setting up a joint enterprise with the Khar'kov Tractor Plant. A miniaturized tractor will help not only our agriculture. For the three types of such vehicles now being made in the USSR, the demand there is more than for passenger cars. The Soviet market would assure stable production for at least 10 to 15 years. "Political events in the USSR will hardly be a hindrance; we shall be working with the independent Ukraine. But, if various political passions come into play in our country, they would have adverse consequences.

"Cooperation with a Yugoslav firm to produce road-building equipment is progressing successfully. Cooperation with a Danish hoisting-device firm is likewise normal. In the Beta catalogues, there are concrete centers, woodworking equipment, gas cylinders and electric hot plates, radiators, steam boilers for the heating of individual buildings. The domestic market for these items is frozen, however," Petur Petrov asserted. "Likewise, the former CEMA market. The obligations of the firm are serious, even though it has receivables of 80 million leva—the contracting parties are in no position to pay. The only normal solution is engineering activity: designing, production, and marketing of equipment for the Western market. It has \$3.5 million worth of contracts. And these, so to speak, are the only bright window in the chaos of economic reform."

Reform, in the opinion of the specialists at Cherven Bryag, will leave a cruel imprint for years. Its price is measured by a severalfold decline in productivity, by apathy and lethargy among the workers. These come from the notorious compensation system that destroyed every kind of work with the watchword "A guy who does a good job gets the same as the biggest goof-off."

If we go by the words of Roman mayoral candidate Nikolay Mikovski, this watchword has been in force there ever since the 1960's, when the former first mayor gave the city the wire and cable plant. It is not clear how the accounting was done, but the enterprise was built in some 10 years or more. A lot of people spent half of their

probationary period making ready to work, says N. Mikovski. This corrupted people. How they worked then could be seen—always on subsidies, with workers mustered from everywhere, but for that reason without qualifications.

The impact of reform has cut off half of the plant staff at Roman. Three hundred persons, sometimes entire families, have registered as unemployed. The rest of the newcomers have long since departed and are not included in the statistics. No mass dismissal has come to Cherven Bryag. The management of the Beta firm has tried to get around it—simply because it has capital assets worth 260 million at the old prices, and these assets have to produce. Otherwise, every day is a dead loss. Only 214 persons have been laid off. However, nearly 700 have left at their own request.

Desire is one thing, what is done is something quite different. Conversion requires both higher skills and capital and time. Concepts like "national security" and "mobilization reserve" require a clear position of the state. In the euphoria of change and after the complete intermingling of politics and economics, the state has remained silent. The consequences are devastating—indifference toward the problems of society, and a lack of confidence in the political and administrative leaders. Petur Petrov thinks that the social price that will be paid for this will be brutal. The scientific potential is now at work; keeping abreast is impossible. For at least five years, technological development will be slowed down. The worst thing, in his opinion, is that, after the destruction, it has not become clear what will be built; nor are the necessary preconditions for building present.

Otherwise, life flows quietly, and only from time to time does a particular queue for cooking oil, sugar, or sausages disturb the monotony. But the people who have a house and a yard do not yet perceive themselves squeezed by the crisis. In particular, they are not oppressed by political prejudices simply because insecurity in the future has no colors. The indifference in the atmosphere is becoming increasingly stratified. For the present, it is quiet in the vicinity of the plants. Much can be said about whether they are welcome or unwelcome in this region. But the enterprises exist, and people live near them and off them. Surely, therefore, all are agreed that a way out of the stagnation must be found as soon as possible. The search must be made soberly, competently, and with thought for tomorrow. Pure politics is a different matter, but a limited circle of people cherish politics.

Argument in Favor of Sovereign Slovak Republic
92CH0105A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK
in Slovak 27 Sep 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Jan Bajanek: "Slovak Citizenship"]

[Text] Centuries of vassalage have evidently left a strong mark in the genes of some inhabitants of Slovakia, whether Slovaks by nationality or Hungarians, Ruthenians, Jews, Ukrainians, or Czechs. Today, materialized as a retainer's approach to resolving the status of the Slovak Republic [SR] in the midst of other states of Europe and the world including the Czech Republic [CR], it manifests itself as if it were a genetically coded longing for dependence. It is the subconsciousness of this colonial submission, this servile mentality which hinders the inhabitants of Slovakia from becoming self-confident and independent citizens of the Slovak Republic.

Why does a SR citizen, while perceiving the unity of both meanings of the word Slovak, not want by himself, independently of other communities, to decide on his affairs on his own sovereign territory? Through freely elected, geographically Slovak voters, Slovakia's inhabitants? The Slovak Republic is a territory belonging to its inhabitants, regardless of what picture of it might be painted by a prejudiced, Czecho-centralist interpretation of Slovakia's national-state movement.

A geographical territory which wants to be regarded also by other countries from the point of view of international law as sovereign, that is, an independent entity, must meet as do today Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia four conditions of the UN concept of state sovereignty: 1. Peaceful orientation; 2. Respect for UN principles; 3. Supreme army control of own territory; 4. Ability to conduct interstate cooperation independently, that is, as an entity recognized in international law.

The territory called the Slovak Republic cannot be even halfway regarded as a sovereign republic or a state in a federation of whatever type; whether built from below or from above or even from the middle it is always only one entity in international law, one entity defending its borders no matter how presumably equal is the internal status of regions, republics, or even states. If the Czech political representation under the pressure of profederation centralists does not want to accede to a two-state arrangement with the SR giving equal status to both, if it is thus unwilling to accept the SR's sovereignty in matters such as defending its borders and an independent international activity, then it is not at all willing to create a two-state formation [sustatie] but rather in its pique and by ultimatum destroy the present, anyway unfavorable to Slovaks, coexistence of CS and SR within the framework of the CSFR.

The federalist bureaucracy as the so-called umbrella over two potentially independent but coexisting states would become devoid of purpose. It is quite immaterial if its composition by nationality includes Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Hungarians and so on, that is inhabitants of

the present CSFR from whatever corner. A federation of the present type inevitably limits Slovak citizenship. What do we need it for? If it does not confer benefits next to the Czech citizenship also on Slovak citizenship! Or does Benelux not exist?

Was it not precisely the orthodox neo-Stalinist forces which in the former USSR attempted by a coup d'etat to forcibly keep together a prison of nations? And is it not again the neo-Stalinist communist-federalist Serbian forces waging war to keep the territory of Croatia which had already declared independence? Well then: Who are those unitary-centralist federalizing forces seeking by means of a shortsighted Klaus-type shock therapy of economic determinism to hold together at any cost and in a monolithic form the legacy of a neo-Stalinist federation of the provincial-colonial type? Aren't they actually the orthodox crypto-neo-Stalinists in a Czechoslovakist-Masarykist guise? Is it not the Benes legacy of resolving the so-called Slovak question?

In whose interest is it to label every free-thinking citizen of the Slovak Republic as a Bolshevik or possibly as a close or distant collaborator of the StB [State Security]? Is this not the proverbial thief calling out? Are there not in the federal offices also turncoats who in their hypocrisy become more Catholic than the pope? Who is it that does not want to give up the inherited prison of Slovak and Czech citizenship? Aren't they federalists of the same ilk as those who operated in Moscow and now in a barbaric fashion with lordly disdain are killing Croatian citizens? If we were truly a democracy it would not be possible to hear views from the Czecho-federalist side on the inadmissibility of a confederative or independent status of Slovakia.

The basis of democracy is freedom of the individual and of the geographic area which free individuals inhabit and which they have decided to regard as their own, in the meaning of state boundaries and their defense, of an independently conducted and thus not derived international policy. And a Slovakia enjoying self-determination and a free citizenship would not pose a military threat to anyone and at the same time would meet the UNO criteria for independent existence.

The name of a geographic unit is commonly derived from the predominant ethnic group, thus usually the nation inhabiting it. Therefore, the Czech lands are Czech and Slovakia is Slovak. We can share SR citizenship with other nationalities or people of different faiths on SR territory. Slovak citizenship is open to all nationalities of independent civic persuasion inhabiting Slovak territory—that is, to Slovaks, Czechs, Jews, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Ruthenians and so on, as is similarly possible in Europe and everywhere in the world.

State-territorial units have evolved naturally on the basis of the most populous nation or nationality inhabiting a certain territory unless of course it was swallowed up by a chauvinistic expansionism of a neighboring larger state-territorial unit. In the present Slovak democracy it

is possible to promote one's own national, minority culture, traditions and so on. But it is logical that if a Slovak citizen of, say, Hungarian or Russian nationality wants to engage himself in Slovak civic life he will do so by using the Slovak language in offices, schools, public activities. Only if a Slovak citizen of, say, Hungarian nationality wanted to preserve in the SR's civic life his ethnic identity on the borderline of his own civic isolation, nothing prevents him as a free Slovak citizen from relinquishing the opportunity to be active in the SR and seeking self-realization in his own national community, for instance only through his language. An analogous civic principle in regard to the cultural self-determination of national minorities is applied in many democracies, including the United States. The Slovak public institutions cannot give orders to anyone on the language in which to conduct his civic business. But it has to be assumed that the Slovak parliament, government, courts, schools—in a word, Slovak public institutions will conduct their civic affairs in the official language of the Slovak population: the Slovak language.

Thus the concept of a free citizenship of Slovakia does not emanate from a preconceived national intolerance but on the contrary, from national tolerance based on common interests in a common democratic Slovak civic state.

Individuals and authorities find it hard to surrender power. Thus it is easy to understand the current wave of activity by the federal centralists in Slovakia and the Czech lands. When they are inhabitants of the SR they still manage to display survivals of the servile, unfree and irresponsible mentality. When they are CR inhabitants they arrogantly maintain a lordly attitude toward the servant who has decided to become a free citizen of the SR.

And finally: Czech-Slovak citizenship cannot after all be built at the expense of Slovak citizenship. And this is evidently what today the federal centralists of any nationality in the CSFR are after.

Common State Seen Must for Economic Success

92CH0097A Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Slovak
23 Oct 91 p 6

[Article by Ivan Svejna, of the Economic Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava: "Slovakia's Economy: Again at the Crossroads"]

[Text] When we are at present searching for the most viable and effective ways of applying the principles of democracy, individual liberty and toward a market economy based on the priority of private ownership, we do so with the perspective of Czecho-Slovakia as a united state of two equal nations and other national minorities. But it is evident that precisely this prior assumption is viewed by certain sociopolitical forces as fundamentally erroneous, nationally unjust and from the point of view of economic transformation even ineffective.

Since today the question of Slovakia's sovereignty is emerging as the principal problem for the further fate of Czecho-Slovakia, let us try to identify the main "supporting" arguments advanced by the advocates of an actual division of the existing federation, as they are being interpreted in isolation as offering the prospect of a faster and more successful entry of Slovakia as an independent entity in international law into the advanced world. I take the liberty to comment on them in the most neutral way possible:

1. Proof of the potential viability of an independent Slovakia in the form the Slovak State existed 1939-45. In its euphoric-patriotic version this is one of the most favored arguments of the advocates of a "pure" Slovak independence. Yet demystifying it is surprisingly simple when we consider the historical context in which this "prosperous state" came into being and existed. During World War II the Slovak State was an open satellite of Germany which then was in the situation of a National Socialist totalitarian extreme conducting a war. Within this context Slovakia owing to its task in [Germany's] war economy could indeed assume the role of a "prosperous" ally. Shipments of primary products (iron, lumber, foodstuffs, and so on) created plenty of jobs and thus gave rise to illusions about an unprecedented expansion of the Slovak economy as compared with the situation it faced in the first Czechoslovak Republic. What is however left out are the results of this "economic expansion": forever lost claims in the billions against the chronically nonpaying great ally (after the war of course in worthless Reichsmarks), war damage and a complicated postwar situation in Slovakia stemming from this alliance. If this is the concept of the hidden potential of the present Slovak economy I regret to say that apparently here someone is mistaken about the basis of economic prosperity and especially the historical time!

2. The possibility of mobilizing a great capital potential from the wide spectrum of Slovak emigration (especially in North America) but ultimately hinging on an "independent" Slovakia. Simply put, our numerous countrymen in the West have been waiting for long decades to be able at last to invest their carefully saved millions of dollars in our and only our Slovakia. On this a small comment may do: A few such enterprising individuals have already paid us a visit, but their idea is roughly as follows—to buy up what may turn out to be a good tourist attraction (the Tatras, historic objects, hotels and the like) and then if possible fix us into the role of a folklorist paradise in the middle of Europe. Given an the interest we have in what currently goes on in our country, we have yet to hear of any concrete investments from that side, especially in the manufacturing sphere which would help the fastest in solving the problems of unemployment and recession.

3. Faith in the vitalizing impulses from an awakened national pride. This peculiar psychological fiction is being presented as a spontaneous surge in the activity of every future citizen of an independent Slovakia once

genuine independence is attained. This argument needlessly "sings paeans" to the sincerity of our national consciousness but as a practical matter we would likely meet again with an uncompromisingly profit-seeking conduct of assiduous individuals, so characteristic of our (and not only our) scene at the turning points of history.

4. Irrefutable facts about the deliberately discriminatory economic policy of the Czech side vis-a-vis Slovakia and Slovak "paying extra" [doplacani] for the federation. At present one can hardly talk about any "paying extra" from the Slovak side (see for instance HOSPODARSKE NOVINY of 3 October 1991—interview with Slovak Republic Finance Minister J. Danco). Discrimination against the Slovak economic development is a highly problem-laden aspect which may be viewed alternatively in connection with the evolution of the Slovak economy in the period of the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-39) when the issue was the pronouncedly asymmetrical model of two coexisting qualitatively quite different economic areas—Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia on one side, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia on the other. Tendencies fostering accentuation of the economic disparities were at that time reinforced also by fundamental errors in approaching the nationality issue expressed by the official doctrine of a so-called unitary Czechoslovak nation. But after 1948 there emerged an evident bureaucratic-colossal promotion of a line calling for a so-called industrialization of Slovakia (and with it the transfer of enormous funds to the benefit of Slovakia), to which in a great measure we owe thanks today for the "presently barely flexible" and unnatural structure of the Slovak economy (the highly monopolistic character of the present Slovak industry, the high proportion of energy-consuming primary production lines and so on). But here too one must take into account the contradictory (or rather generally distorted) informative value of statistical data which have been manipulated as a matter of priority by perceiving statistics and economic data as an ideological tool.

5. The argument that the present introduction of economic reform fails to take account of the specific features of the Slovak economy. In brief, this involves emphasizing the absence of respect for the problems peculiar to the Slovak economy (conversion, drop in employment caused by the collapse of regional "supergiants" in industry, problems in the agriculture and the like) and generalizing the reform process as such for the whole of CSFR. But all the while this call for a selective, socially oriented reform is essentially nothing else than an effort to portray as the alternative to the current economic reform the "good old" need for a "good and soft" hand of government paternalism. The issue of creating a competitive market environment is thereby shunted to an undetermined time.

On the assumption that the Czecho-Slovak Government's policy pursues the goal of making our economy part of the economically advanced world, it is then imperative that in this process it respects especially these realities:

1. The ongoing process of uniting the economically advanced Europe which is based on each country having

to gradually surrender a degree of political and economic sovereignty.

2. Opinions of the financial world, above all the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

3. The fact that the foundation of a united Europe will be parliamentary democracy, balanced government budgets and an anti-inflationary monetary policy.

The above brief characterization (of course not exhaustive) of the main "trumps" of the advocates of an unconditional and absolute independence of Slovakia from the perspective of an economic analysis merely demonstrates the shallowness of their argumentation. These relationships torn out of their context have recently been catered to the public with ever-growing intensity, while the variations in how they are presented adjust to the specific opportunities offered by the political climate that can be exploited for personal political ambition. The call for decentralization then deliberately overlooks the fact that the economic reform as well as the stage in resolving the issue of state power arrangement are now gradually creating room for a decentralization of the economy in a virtually absolute sense—down to the individual citizen, while respecting the attributes of individual personal liberty and protection of private property as the basic prerequisites for building a competitive market system. At the same time the economic reform steps have a tendency to create (especially after concentrating forces on the process of a thoroughgoing privatization and establishment of capital markets) conditions for a transition from the present understandable recessionary state to the so-called zero point and afterward to effective economic growth. But assertions that in the transition from one diametrically opposite economic system (centrally planned economy) to another (market economy) we could have avoided the present economic situation by some kind of "a better alternative, proceeding in greater conformity with social concerns" (and even in Slovakia, only if it were independent) are dismissible illusions fed by ignorance of the basic economic contexts, deformation of economic thinking by the preceding totalitarian period as well as fanciful nationalism.

Yet it must be emphasized that certain economic functions will inevitably continue having the form of centralized institutions (currency emission, certain aspects of budgetary policy, a uniform financial market and so on) to the extent it clearly flows from the essence of operating the federation's economy efficiently. In the matter of these powers one cannot look for any "meaningful" compromises on the grounds of the federation. But if it involves for instance the structure of the republic budgets, local taxes, creating free trade zones, tax breaks for foreign capital and the like, in these matters the powers can be decentralized.

It seems necessary here to call attention to the most glaring negative consequences of a breakup of the united

CSFR from the perspective of a potential emergence of two independent republics—Czech and Slovak:

- First of all there will be a rapid decline of the importance CSFR now has in its role of a new democracy in central Europe; “adding up” the importance of the two independent republics will never amount to its previous standing in the eyes of the world community concerned with stability in the central European region.
- The impact of an abrupt dissolution of longstanding cooperative linkages in the CSFR’s internal market would be unimaginably negative for the two “independent” economies.
- There will be a serious threat to the present value of currency (possibly then already two currencies) and to their internal convertibility, within the short term having the effect of lowering the exchange rates of the national currencies.
- Unemployment in both republics (Slovakia in particular) will increase markedly.
- Slovakia will have to significantly increase imports of finished products and resign itself to an absolute decline in its attractiveness (none too high even at present) to foreign capital.
- Enormous sums will have to be expended on building a new system of state administration, army, police, representation abroad, customs system and the like.
- In the case of Slovakia what is likely to happen very soon is that under the pressure of social tensions the rather nebulous “national unity” of the country will arise as a problem, the cry of “Pragocentrism” will surely be quickly replaced with the notion of a “Bratislava-centrism” and nationality problems (especially the question of the Hungarian minority) will newly rise in intensity.
- There will understandably be complex and protracted problems with meeting international obligations (especially economic) of the defunct federation by the individual independent states.
- In the final consequence there will be a growing tendency to question the territorial integrity and borders of such new independent states which are very critically tied to many unequivocal international treaties and guarantees of territorial integrity (Trianon, Nuremberg, treaties with the FRG and the like) which deal solely with a united Czecho-Slovakia!

The problems involved in attaining an equal status for Slovakia and its economy from the point of view of continued existence of the CSFR and of the process of European integration are in our opinion not so much problems of nationalism but rather a matter of the success of economic reform as a whole on the level of the federation.

Economic Importance of Federation’s Survival

92CH0096A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Slovak 3, 10, 17 Oct 91

[Article in three installments by Eng. Stanislav Spanar: “What Federation Means to Us”—first paragraph is HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[3 Oct p 7]

[Text] The following article which we will publish in three installments in the HOSPODARSKE NOVINY weekly edition was written by a Slovak economist who is a longtime student of Czechoslovakia’s economic links and relations. His analysis, rather extensive for newspaper material, reviews also the history of our economic interrelationship, does not omit international comparison and in its concluding part seeks to answer the question of what a liquidation of the present common state would mean for the Czech and Slovak republic. We publish this article fully aware that it is highly polemical material, yet supremely topical in these weeks and months in view of current domestic developments. It begins with questions many of us are presently asking.

Why is it more advantageous for the citizens of Slovakia (but also those of the Czech lands) to live in a federation than in an independent state? What then are the concrete advantages of Czechoslovak federation...? On these and similar questions my article seeks to offer several economic arguments which may help our citizens to better orient themselves.

I will not deal with political and cultural areas; my concern is with the economic sphere. For the subject’s sake I will also abstain from deep theorizing or dabbling in the business of futurologists who work only with more or less qualified estimates. I am interested in facts and conclusions that can be logically drawn from them. This is the method I will adhere to in my deliberation.

How Do Others Go About It?

Clearly there must be many reasons in the world for nations to prefer life in a wider democratic whole to life in a small unit when nations of West Europe are freely and on their own volition joining the supranational European Community which among other requirements has the sine qua non condition that members surrender a great deal of their sovereignty, transfer considerable political and economic powers to a common leadership. This has been well thought through by 340 million free and informed citizens of these countries. And not only by them: several million more in Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland (where the concept of sovereignty extends truly the farthest to the canton, village, and all the way to the citizen) are eager to follow them as soon as possible.

The principal motivation for this trend apart from security reasons are economic considerations: The vast majority of people in these countries are prepared to take

into account solely the most rational, economic arguments, concrete data, or possibly their own experience telling them in what, how and when they feel or will feel freer and better off economically. Moreover, a larger democratic whole offers greater stability, political as well as economic.

What Would Have Been If...

But let us turn to us in Czechoslovakia. For an introduction allow me to engage in a bit of musing and paint an imaginary picture of how Czechoslovakia would have fared after 1938 if there had been uninterrupted normal democratic development under conditions of a free market and private enterprise, if there had been no Hitler, war and all that it spawned including the later consequences.

In 1937 Slovakia accounted for 36 percent of Czechoslovakia's total area, 25 percent of its population and approximately 7.5 percent of total Czechoslovak production. In comparison with the Czech lands (Bohemia and the Moravian-Silesian lands—hereafter only Czech lands) not only Slovak industry but also the infrastructure was poorly developed: trade, transport, communications, banking, services.... Average wages, too, lagged behind the highly developed Czech lands, by 19 up to 33 percent in individual branches.

In the 20 years of the First Republic, from 1918 to 1937, Slovakia too advanced, its economic strength grew but there still remained a large difference from the Czech lands caused by the different economies inherited from Austro-Hungary still from the beginning of this century. But these twenty years produced a new element, until then unknown: A new Slovak intelligentsia emerged, humanistic as well as technical. This is a very important fact when considering further developments.

Gradual progress in training Slovakia's own experts, their increased self-confidence and professional caliber in an environment of a free worldwide exchange of ideas, travel and integration with the outside world would have led inexorably to increasing the weight of the Slovak representation in the top leadership of the state which over time would draw the logical conclusion that the disparity is a fundamentally unhealthy state of affairs. An appropriate investment policy, tax breaks for entrepreneurs and support for attracting foreign capital to Slovak industry and agriculture would have led to a gradual and natural increase in Slovakia's share even as the economic development of the Czech lands continued uninterrupted.

It is my view that within approximately 80 to 100 years this share could have attained the level of the Czech lands while preserving Slovakia's specific conditions, for instance its greater emphasis on international tourism. All this would have taken place under the harsh conditions of the market, with an open economy, a freely convertible koruna. It would have meant that only worldclass products could be marketed, high-quality services and productivity: our attaining an equal level

with the Czech lands would have taken place on a much higher economic and qualitative level. Czechoslovakia as a whole could have become another Switzerland in terms of living standards but with a significantly stronger economic potential and international importance.

If someone thinks that 80 to 100 years is far too long, he is invited to consider that development of the Czech lands took approximately two hundred years and, second, it would be us right now who would see it come to fruition.

In the final stage, roughly around this time, Czechoslovakia would have had actually four regional, advanced economies, of course interlinked and influencing each other. Each would contribute its share to the nation's wealth, whether in the form of taxes, investments, revenues from exports and tourist trade, or the wide array of manufactured products. Each of these regional economies would have its specific and given features: German precision work in the border-area glass works and textile mills, Czech ingenuity in the light consumer as well as heavy industry in the Czech lands, Slovak hospitality and nature in the tourist industry and Hungarian experience and high productivity in agriculture and food production in southern Slovakia. It would have been a kind of a Europe in microcosm, on a high qualitative level with a strong currency, democratic, with a population of about 20 to 25 million.

According to a competent estimate we would have been in the tenth place in terms of population and about the fifth or sixth place in living standards and economic power in Europe. And this kind of Czechoslovakia would have carried weight in Europe and been able to undertake quite a bit economically. Already during the First Republic there was talk about linking Slovakia to a Switzerland-Austria-Slovakia tourist belt, as well as of purchasing part of the Yugoslav Adria coast and a direct rail link through Austria. So that way we would have had the sea as well... Now let anyone tell me whether he would not like living in such a Czechoslovakia.

... And the Reality

But time cannot be gained back; fifty years have elapsed and nothing, or almost nothing of it has been realized. While with the help of a higher volume of investment Slovakia's share in the total Czechoslovak industrial output has leveled up to the Czechs to a nearly adequate 29 percent of total CSFR production, given the overall decline of our economy and Czechoslovakia's and mainly the Czech lands' slide from the tenth place to somewhere among the third or fourth ten it however means the level of developing countries. Alas, the higher share of Slovakia has meant no improvement in the level and overall efficiency of the Czechoslovak economy.

A vivid demonstration of this fact are the results of marketing our products on the world market. While in 1948-50 Czechoslovakia's share in total world trade was about 2 percent, in 1990 it was only 0.3 percent. It means that Czechoslovakia has fallen back or, more precisely,

that its products have been crowded out of the world markets by better quality products of other countries.

Countries comparable with Czechoslovakia, as for instance Belgium or The Netherlands, have reported in recent years a substantially higher share of world trade than ours. To illustrate: In 1988 Czechoslovak exports were worth \$22 billion, which means \$1,597 per capita. Belgium and Luxembourg with a population slightly over 10 million exported goods worth \$92 billion, or \$9,017 per capita. Finland, which still after the war ranked with very poor and little developed countries, exported goods worth \$22 billion in 1988, which with a population of barely 5 million amounts to \$4,475 per capita.

By this I want to say that the joy and satisfaction Slovaks feel at reaching an equal level with the Czech lands ought to be factually corrected by the realization that it is equalization on a very low level: "So at last we are now all equal, but equal to zero!"

Basic Criteria

But let us go on. Before delving into concrete economic deliberations and arguments one has to cite as a basic fact that as of 1 January 1991 the Slovak Republic had a population of 5,263,561, that is 33.6 percent of the CSFR total. Slovakia accounted for an area of 49,035 square kilometers, representing 38.4 percent of the entire CSFR area.

It is from these numbers that the following examination is derived. This means for instance that if the performance of Slovakia's industry or foreign trade were to be equal to that of the Czech lands it should reach approximately the same figure of 33 percent, that is, one-third of the entire CSFR's performance—a 1 to 2 ratio. The same should roughly apply to investments as well even though it is possible for the ratio to fluctuate in some years. If this performance is less (or on the contrary investments are more) it means that the Czech lands are supporting Slovakia. The performance in agriculture and tourism for instance should in turn come rather close to the 38 percent figure. Again it means generally that if it does not Slovakia's performance in these branches is not equal to the Czech lands. This only by way of introduction.

Will We Pay Foreign Currency for "Pilsner," Too?

I would be gladly mistaken but so far no economist has made public in what concretely the citizens of Slovakia are or will be better off with economic independence. Perhaps if we had to buy for foreign currency in addition to vitally needed technical equipment, oil, possibly coffee and tropical fruit also electric power, passenger cars, trucks, locomotives, trolley buses, streetcars, textiles, machine tools, Pilsner or Budvar beer from the Czech lands? And some people actually believe that Slovakia will earn the money for such imports by exporting sheet and rolled metal, aluminum, cement... when their manufacture in turn requires purchasing the

raw materials abroad? Moreover, the world prices of these semimanufactures are substantially lower than the prices of products of the engineering and electronics industries in which there is a greater input of human labor and design talent.

What quantities of such semimanufactures would have to be produced and sold to earn enough money for the purchases mentioned earlier? Their production is in addition to other things extremely demanding in terms of electric power which Slovakia has in short supply and imports from the Czech lands, its production moreover being highly destructive to the environment. The Czech Republic's installed power generating capacity is about three times that of the Slovak Republic. This means that Slovakia imports about one-third of its power need from the Czech lands, mainly from thermal power plants in northern Bohemia which have "succeeded" in producing a moonscape where everything is devastated—land, water as well as the air. This area was put on the UN list as the dirtiest part of Europe. Nothing of this sort, and especially in such an extent, is taking place in Slovakia! Alone on these, purely self-seeking grounds it is better for Slovak citizens to live in a common Czechoslovak state.

But if in case of a separation Slovakia would have to import power for instance from Austria, it would first have to build a transmission grid and then pay for the electricity. The prospects for such payments have been already discussed. Nor is it realistic to speculate about the oil pipeline's spigot, for the simple reason that it is Soviet oil and if the USSR wants to continue trading with the Czech lands (which it will) it can easily compel Slovnaft to keep moving the oil or gasoline further westward. Furthermore, there are currently serious considerations of building a pipeline extension from Ingolstadt in the FRG to Kralupy or Litvinov, which would make the Czech lands practically independent of USSR deliveries.

[10 Oct p 7]

[Text] In the future international commerce will not deal with any money other than free currencies—this has to be accepted as a fact! Whatever fine agreements may be concluded between Slovak and Czech enterprises on further unchanged mutual deliveries in the future, the goods or products must be valued at the world price level. Even though it still won't be free trade on convertible currency basis, and equally in the clearing or barter method of mutual commerce, one's products will have to be available in sufficient quantity and quality in order to exchange something for something else.

How then does Slovakia want to come to terms with the fact that until now the CSFR obtains about 80 percent of its free currency receipts from exporting goods produced in the Czech lands (after the war it was up to 95 percent), from transport technology through investment assemblies of the chemical and energy industries all the way to glass, textiles, beer, hops, and so on... But already for

years the earned free currency funds have been distributed in a ratio of 33.3 to 66.6 percent. Moreover, in connection with a relatively more extensive investment program in Slovakia it has been receiving over the last 10 to 15 years in the form of expensive Western technology almost 5 percent more of free currency on an annual average than it would according to the 1 to 2 ratio.

Labor Productivity

If my Slovak economist colleagues should argue that in the event of Slovak independence people will immediately begin to work harder and more honestly and that right away all in unison and enthusiastically will begin within the framework of their primary production to turn out world-class products, my advice to them is to forget about it quickly: Such arguments are in the realm of pious wishes and have nothing in common with reality. There are three main requirements for raising the qualitative level of production and services: money, money and money—for purchasing state-of-the-art technology and for training cadres, from workers to technicians to managers. And this money, too, has to be earned. Or borrowed. And here an independent Slovakia will again be at a disadvantage as compared with Czechoslovakia. For one thing it will (unfortunately) be known in the world that it was Slovakia whose separatism initiated the breakup of the republic (however hard it may be to admit it to ourselves—world opinion just happens to be that way), and I, too, harbor little illusion about the deep democracy of a future government system in Slovakia.

Already now Slovak politics resound with many calls for an authoritarian regime—democratic traditions are weak. For if it comes to tearing Czechoslovakia apart, it will only serve proof that a general assault on the liberal model of society has succeeded and that the victory has been won by a platform of pseudoleftist, nationalist egalitarianism, populism and authoritarianism emphasizing a priority of Slovak demands and oriented toward the outdated values of former regimes. (Suffice it to read NOVY SLOVAK, LITERARNY TYZDENNIK, or the real pearl among these periodicals, ZMENA. There are people in the world charged with following the provincial press. The conclusions and abstracts from this monitoring then serve responsible authorities—for instance, governments—to gain a picture of what goes on and eventually to take an informed position, and in this case it is abundantly clear from where the wind is blowing. Moreover, the big press agencies have their own correspondents in Slovakia.) For it is an impossibility for the forces which would one day manage to prevail with a nationalist authoritarian orientation (Slovakia's independence would be precisely the proof) to be at the same time deeply democratic and liberal. One cannot be red and blue at the same time. If it comes to an independent Slovakia it will be an essentially undemocratic Slovakia. As we know, the world does not lend to such regimes. There is of course the possibility to lean toward "that mighty oak out there," but of course with all the potential and likely risks... I would not want to live to see

those in the Czech lands vindicated who contend that Slovakia has never really belonged to the West and by its present choice has proved that it belongs rather to the Balkans....

Foreign capital is very, very cautious. Suffice it to follow carefully the present trends when foreign investors, if they invest in the CSFR at all, select mostly enterprises in the Czech lands which they generally regard as more stable. Moreover, the close proximity of the economic giant Germany as well as of Austria and their material and idea potential already now exert great influence on stimulating Czech entrepreneurial activity. In the Czech lands there are still quite a few former entrepreneurs who, or possibly their offspring, will again start in business, there is an entrepreneurial tradition, ample foreign language capability, higher professionalism and so on. Virtually none of this applies to Slovakia and hence one can expect that in the event of independence its economic development will markedly slow down.

I also have to disenchant those of my countrymen who contend that the faster development of Slovakia over the past roughly 40 years was due to Slovaks working harder and being more industrious. Labor productivity can be easily measured: It is the quantity of products valued in korunas per unit of time—usually an hour. And labor productivity in industry still remains about 15 to 20 percent (according to branch) higher in the Czech lands than in Slovakia. One understands that this is due to the type of industries built in Slovakia as a primary production complementing the historically already existing high-quality processing industries in the Czech lands. By this I mean to suggest that the higher labor productivity of two-thirds of workers in the whole of Czechoslovakia understandably lowers the prices of products and services, which means that it is Slovakia that benefits the most. For this reason, too, it is better off in a federation.

A few more facts on the issue of industriousness. A survey of work time utilization by workers in industrial national enterprises for the years 1980, 1985, 1987, and 1988 shows a Czech Republic [CR] average of 91.1 percent, and for the Slovak Republic [SR] 91.0 percent; the share of overtime in total time worked was 5.45 percent in CR and 5.02 percent in SR. That both nations are about equally industrious is attested to by the fact that during working hours the pubs are equally crowded with workers in the Czech lands as in Slovakia.

Agriculture

Let us now look at agriculture where some believe that we are the better off. Indeed, reports of high or even record yields in grain farming and high productivity in animal husbandry come for the most part from Slovakia. But only from its southern sections which no one knows whom they may ultimately join in the event of Slovak independence. The other parts of Slovakia are substantially worse off.

At the end of 1989 Slovakia as a whole had 2,453,000 hectares of farmland representing 36.3 percent of the

CSFR's total farmland. But on this land it produced only 52,139 million korunas' [Kcs] worth of gross agricultural output which amounted to 32.6 percent of the entire CSFR gross agricultural output. The number of persons engaged in farming in the SR was 350,956 in 1989; of this number 270,320 were in unified agricultural cooperatives [JRD's]. So the corresponding numbers for the CR ought to be about 702,000 or respectively 541,000 workers, whereas the actual total as of the same date was 551,079 of whom 375,232 worked in the unified cooperatives. Thus it wonders little that in 1989 gross farm output per worker was Kcs168,004 in Slovakia as against Kcs211,978 in the Czech Republic. That is a rather substantial difference!

What can one conclude from this? It is that even in agricultural production Slovakia is not completely self-sufficient, that the Czech agriculture operates more efficiently and at lower cost and that lowers the average prices of farm products and foodstuffs in CSFR as a whole. This situation was confirmed vividly when a short time ago after the first price liberalization Czech butter was sold in Slovakia at a lower price than domestic butter despite the cost of transportation. For this reason, too, Slovak Republic citizens are better off in a federation.

Thus neither in industry nor in agriculture or foreign trade Slovakia is better off than the Czech lands; on the contrary, the higher productivity, range of products and revenues in the Czech lands benefit also Slovakia both in the form of lower average prices and redistribution of hard currency export revenues. These, too, are the advantages of a common state.

Tourist Industry

And what about the tourist industry, the incorrigible optimist will ask. The total number of foreign visitors to the CSFR lodged in tourist hospitality establishments in 1988 was 3,963,763. Of this number 855,340 foreigners were lodged in Slovak establishments representing 21.6 percent of the total and 3,108,423 persons in the Czech Republic, that is, 78.4 percent.

It is generally known and will be confirmed by anyone working for a travel agency that nearly 90 percent of the foreign visitors want to see Prague. Only the shortage of beds makes it impossible for now to accommodate all who are interested to see the capital. The demand for Prague enables travel agencies packaging organized tours to "tack on" to a stay in Prague other less attractive localities so that the hotel capacity is utilized at least to some extent. Prague and the west Bohemian spas of Karlovy Vary, Mariánské and Františkovy Lázně have long been the bottlenecks of foreign tourists in CSFR.

I do not yet have partial data for this year but it is estimated that in 1991 the number of foreign tourists visiting Czechoslovakia will be about fourfold or sixfold the 1988 figure. Such an enormous increase will further aggravate the proportion, or more precisely disproportion, to Slovakia's disfavor. Indeed, since the beginning

of this year until now the onrush of tourists especially from German-speaking countries to visit Prague has been tremendous, unprecedented in the past. The West is rediscovering Prague, Prague has become a hit and it belongs to good form to visit it.

Utilization of the different types of lodging establishments in the SR and CR in 1988 was as follows: Of the total of 3,963,763 foreign visitors in the CSFR during 1988, 3,234,073 persons were lodged in permanent facilities (hotels, motels, group lodgments), of which 700,012 persons or 21.6 percent in SR and 2,534,061 persons or 78.4 percent in the Czech Republic. Open-air facilities (tent camps and public camping sites) in CSFR accommodated 666,983 foreigners, of whom 148,072 or 22.2 percent were in SR and 518,911 or 77.8 percent in CR. During 1988 Bratislava and the High Tatras had a combined total of 2,048,479 visitors (including indigenous) staying overnight whereas in Prague alone it was 3,977,211 persons, another 1,002,269 persons in the west Bohemian spas and 1,079,373 persons in Brno. This does not include visitors to the Krkonoše mountains, Plzeň, Ostrava and other places.

So it is evident that a substantial proportion (nearly 80 percent) of revenues from tourism both domestic and foreign is earned for the federation in the Czech lands and again it is redistributed for the benefit of Slovakia where hotels are being built in tourist centers but their capacity utilization (occupancy rate) is low: 38.2 percent in the High Tatras, 35.7 percent in Piestany, whereas it is 66.6 percent in Prague, 62.5 percent in Mariánské Lázně, 60.7 percent in Spindleruv Mlýn. As for the utilization of bed capacity it shows a decent rate only in Bratislava among the Slovak localities—66.9 percent. In the event of Slovak independence, however, it will no longer be in the interest of Czech travel agencies to further "tack on" to Prague for instance the High Tatras. The number of foreign visitors as well as the revenues from tourist business in Slovakia will be substantially reduced.

[17 Oct p 7]

[Text] So far we have been discussing the economic impact in the hypothetical situation when Slovakia already has its independence. But this state of affairs will be preceded in time by a process of separation, or breaking apart, which will be extremely painful and literally so for instance for families, but also will carry over (perhaps most importantly) into the economy. At this moment I cannot even encompass the whole array of problems which will ensue from dividing up an economy which until then was united, deeply interwoven and dovetailed. What comes to mind immediately are the unavoidable output drops in factories which depend on one another for deliveries if the other side balks and simply stops honoring its commitments. In addition it will be necessary to reroute or possibly reduce rail and air transport connections, communications, change currency, all official stationery, state emblems, house an army which comes from the Czech lands and it is not excluded that in the moment of separation Czech

employers (pointing to their own unemployment rate) will dismiss 30,000 Slovak workers who will immediately join the ranks of the Slovak jobless....

In the event of breaking away Slovakia will lose all representation abroad and for a time will be virtually without a connection to the world. According to estimates the act of separation alone and the immediate concrete consequences flowing from it would entail costs for both republics on the order of billions. All this, of course, will have to be paid by someone and the effect will be to immediately lower the standard of living.

Federation Is Stronger

Why is federation still better than independence? We have already said that in the past 40 years in accordance with the national slogan that Slovakia has to be industrialized more has been invested in Slovakia than Slovakia generated itself [as published]. Alone in the 10 years from 1975 to 1985 investments going to Slovakia amounted to 5 percent annually in excess of its yearly production. This means that over 10 years additional funds invested here amounted to nearly one-half of Slovakia's annual product.

In free market conditions government investments will of course be largely phased out. But even so a rather large area will remain, when the federation will be able or need to intervene and manage developments. I have in mind for instance the entire social area, upgrading the railroad system, construction of highways, airports, communications and other public facilities which will be the government's responsibility in the new conditions as well. It is in the federation's capability to quickly concentrate the necessary means and capacities and according to the need to take action to quickly set up and make operational what the situation demands. A concrete example here is the flow of massive financial resources from (the hatred) federation to the conversion of armaments industries in Slovakia and other resources to finance relocation of the oil pipeline from Zitny Ostrov. An independent Slovakia (as of course the Czech lands as well) would have to save a long time to assemble the funds necessary for needed investments; construction projects would take longer and meet with greater difficulties. This is another reason for preserving Czechoslovakia.

Allow me one more example from the area of external economic relations. Experts know, the broad public presumes, that it is very important for an exporter to have a name in the world, a trademark, reputation (Image, Goodwill [previous two words in English]). The "Made in Czechoslovakia" trademark has in the past 70 years earned its place and believe it or not, many foreign customers of our products still buy them because of this trademark. That's why I maintain that selling purely Slovak products to the world would be a very slow, cumbersome endeavor; in the world's tough competition it will be very difficult to promote a product with a new and unknown trademark.

This of course applies to products and services until now produced in Slovakia and marketed abroad under the label of Tatra, Skoda, Cedok, Czechoslovak Airlines and so on. Their export would surely decline because in the commercial world it is routine that the buyer backs out of a contract when the supplier changes: for instance, when the documents should show that the supplier of Tatra trucks is Banovce instead of Tatra Koprivnice. This is an argument difficult to express concretely in korunas, for instance in terms of how much less could be exported; however, it does not mean that it should not be taken into account. For it, too, will contribute to a major decline in the living standards of Slovakia's citizens.

In addition to what has already been mentioned one has to realize that in economic matters democracy does not have much of a place. The economically stronger partner simply dictates the terms. As a stronger Czechoslovakia we will be able to deal from a position of the stronger one—thus obtaining better terms for both our nations—for instance with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, or Denmark, Iceland, and others, and on at least an equal basis with, for instance, The Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Poland, Austria and many other countries. But an independent Slovakia would always be in the position of the weaker partner.

In the event of Slovakia's economic independence I can further assert confidently that in addition to the effect of factors mentioned earlier virtually all products which are made or will be made in Slovakia will be generally more expensive than in the case of a normal continuation of Czechoslovakia and hence also of its larger market. I am led to this conclusion by the simple consideration that the size of the market for these products will shrink to one-third, thus also the quantity of products will be one-third and capital depreciation will have to be wrapped around one-third of the output which means tripling it for a single product as compared with present practice.

It is a general rule that the larger the economic unit the stronger it is, less susceptible to external influences, more self-sustaining and able to handle crisis situations more quickly.

Let Us Sum It Up

In the event of Slovakia's independence the factors which favored the Slovak Republic's population within the framework of present-day Czechoslovakia will instantly cease to be effective. This will immediately cause a great surge in the prices of virtually all goods, general shortages, some factories will be shut down. There will be a desperate shortage of electric power, cars (both passenger and trucks), tractors, buses, streetcars as well as spare parts for them, of hard coal, machine tools, light consumer goods generally (with the exception of washing machines and refrigerators), beer, glass; food prices will go up. There will be a steep decline in the revenues from exporting industrial goods, from tourist traffic. Certainly at least for a few years the influx of

foreign capital will decrease substantially (we see it on the example of Yugoslavia), there will be a shortage of funds for new investment, reconstruction, modernization, for improving environment and the quality of production, for education and so on....

While a few individuals posted in the new offices may satisfy their ambition, the material cost of establishing these offices—where this will be necessary—as well as personnel and operating expenses will be borne by the entire Slovak society. And if, God forbid, one of the consequences would be a separation of the southern part of Slovakia and with its roughly 600,000 inhabitants joining Hungary—something that cannot be excluded—great difficulties would arise instantly with food production and assuring the rest of the population of supply of staple foods.

There will be an end to the inflow of federal funds to support arms industry conversion, for ecology, the defense expenditures will go up, social tensions will increase as will unemployment.

The situation and prospects of economically weak Slovak entrepreneurial entities in a free competition with the sharks from West Europe, America and Japan will become rather dismal. Over time Slovakia would inexorably turn into a nation lacking economic self-determination where the more solid enterprises would all be in foreign hands. In this matter when slogans are shouted about Slovakia's independence "Slovakia for the Slovaks," it represents a fundamental misconception about the expected results. I believe that people in the Czech lands are more cognizant of these consequences and conduct themselves accordingly.

This then is the prospect for Slovakia being promoted by certain irresponsible politicians who deep down are not seeking Slovakia's well-being but rather incite strife and on a wave of nationalist emotions want to turn the people's voice solely to their own profit. It is evident that a possible separation will harm both parts of the republic, the Czech lands, too. But in view of a better structure of industry, entrepreneurial traditions, having as neighbors two advanced countries and being better prepared to absorb foreign capital the Czech Republic will get out of the rut more quickly and the difference vis-a-vis Slovakia will in time begin to grow again. Who knows, perhaps in 20 years a new Slovak generation can come to a different view and will again want to join in a common republic... What the future view of the Czech public of such possible wish may be is something that I am not now prepared to guess.

What Will Slovaks Get in Return for All This?

Recognition of Slovakia as a sovereign state, which means that they will be able to tell the world proudly that they are no longer Czechoslovaks but Slovaks. But this is much too little to earn the world's respect and recognition! Austrians or the Dutch—to name comparable countries—are respected in the world not because they are Austrian or Dutch (nationality is neither a merit nor

a qualification) but because they have profoundly democratic traditions and institutions which account for the way they conduct themselves both at home and abroad and also because they have already accomplished and created something: that they are producing high-quality goods competitive in the world. I am afraid that an independent Slovakia will not be able to claim one or the other for a long time to come.

Fortunately, the separation variant need not come at all. It depends entirely on us because we now have an historic chance. Let us avoid mistakes of the past, let us begin anew and see before us the goal of a prosperous and democratic Czechoslovakia. In it we are no longer faced with the threat of Slovakia's extinction as a nation as we were in 1918 with Magyarization about to deal the final blow; we have our own intelligentsia, our own experts, the year is 1991, we are no longer the underdeveloped, nearly illiterate nation of the beginning of this century.

So there is no longer a reason to have complexes about the elder brother for he, too, is today in a bad shape thanks to the workings of socialism (for socialism he has paid a heavier price than we) and has enough worries of his own. Let us prove, above all, by professionalism (which is what we lack in comparison with the world) on all levels that we are capable of being a mature nation. And in cooperation with Czechs or Hungarians, Germans, Poles, Ruthenians and all people of good will let us again build a prosperous and economically strong, independent Czechoslovakia in a prosperous, strong and democratic Europe.

Private Farmer's Income Tax Composition Explained

92CH0102A Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY (supplement) in Czech 16 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Helena Machova and Harry Dvorak: "Private Farmer's Income Tax"—first paragraph is ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] The stipulated date for the population for presenting income tax returns for 1991 to the tax authorities (the appropriate finance office) is 15 February 1992. So that this deadline—which appears, for the time being, to be quite far away—should not come as a surprise to agricultural entrepreneurs, we summarize the most important aspects with which the income tax payers should familiarize themselves; we shall focus on specifics affecting taxpayers whose taxes are based on agricultural activities—more specifically, we shall focus on independent farmers.

Until last year, the tax on the income of the population derived from agricultural production was regulated by Law No. 172/1988 on the agricultural tax, the components of which are the following: tax on land parcels, tax based on the volume of wages and remuneration, and tax on profits. As of 1 January 1991, Law No. 389/1990 on taxing the income of the population is in effect, and also

includes income derived from agricultural production, and at the same time, rescinds the provisions of Law No. 172/1988 which have to do with taxing the income of the population derived from agricultural production.

According to Law No. 389/1990, a private farmer, in establishing a basis for the tax on income, has the opportunity of electing one of the variants listed below. The selection of the method for computing and the actual computation are also based on the level and method of accounting records used as well as the type of bookkeeping involved.

Standard Flat Rate

For the taxpayer, the simplest method of determining his tax base is to use the standard flat rate. This method is made possible by Section 13 of Law No. 389/1990, but only in certain cases. The conditions are that the entrepreneur operates with a maximum of one employee. The tax administrator may set this flat rate on the basis of anticipated revenues. To the extent to which actual revenues are apt to differ considerably from anticipated revenues, an adjustment of the tax rate is made next year or this provision is rescinded. Entrepreneurs who establish their tax base by this method, are generally assigned a so-called recordkeeping duty with respect to their accounting methods, that is to say, they are obligated to maintain records regarding all achieved revenues or even additional records, which will be identified by the tax administrator.

The law on taxing the population's income defines revenues derived from agricultural production as follows:

a) Revenues based on plant and livestock production, forestry activities, fishing activities conducted on land parcels and on waterways owned by citizens, utilized by citizens, or possibly utilized on the basis of another legal relationship or operated without the ownership of land plots.

b) Revenues based on the sale of agricultural products from the taxpayer's own plant or livestock production, including agricultural products purchased from other citizens.

c) Revenues based on seasonal activities conducted in conjunction with agricultural production, during which the means of production at the disposal of agricultural production are utilized generally during periods when they are not fully utilized for agricultural production purposes (for example, conducting a hauling business, skidding timber toward mills, etc.).

d) Revenues based on secondary production related to plant and livestock production, provided they are restricted to processing personal agricultural production, or revenues based on seasonal production (for example, cottage production of wooden tools and basket products).

Percentile Specification

Another possible method for determining the tax base is the percentile subtraction of expenditures from revenues. The percentile rate depends on the specific operating activity:

a) When engaging in livestock production, the raising of domestic animals, of aquatic and terrestrial creatures, or in extracting timber, 55 percent is deducted from the achieved revenues; livestock production for this purpose is defined as the raising of cattle, hogs, goats, horses, poultry, other domestic animals, furbearing and laboratory animals, bees, freshwater fish, silkworms, the breeding of exotic birds, snails for human consumption, including products based on raising these animals.

b) When engaged in the cultivation of special varieties, 45 percent is deducted from the achieved revenues; special varieties for this purpose are defined as grapes, hops, tobacco, vegetables, fruit, medicinal plants, herbs, and aromatic plants, flowers and decorative shrubs, fruit bushes, cultivated mushrooms, products based on cultivating a forest, other forest products, seeds, seedlings and all types of propagation materials, including products from these varieties (for purposes of this law, the extraction of timber is also considered to be a specialized variety).

c) In all other cases of agricultural production, 40 percent is deducted from achieved revenues.

Even in this case, it is sufficient for the taxpayer to keep a record of his revenues. This method for determining deductible expenses can be recommended for its simplicity. It is more advantageous if the entrepreneur determines the actual volume of his expenditures (see below) as well as the percentile deductions and applies, naturally, the higher of the two.

Reported Difference

The third method is the establishment of the tax base by the difference between actual documented revenues and actual documented expenditures. To the extent to which the taxpayer applies this method, he must have so-called single-entry bookkeeping records. Actual expenditures are then deducted from actual revenues.

In the case of farmers, the predominant portion of their expenditures is based on the costs for acquiring material, seed, livestock, fodder, fertilizer, chemical plant protection agents, motor fuels, etc. Additional costs are represented by repair and maintenance of agricultural machinery, tractors, barns for animals, etc., costs of energy, of house taxes, and taxes on plots of land.

A significant sum is represented by writeoffs of capital equipment. These are applied at the level stipulated by Federal Ministry of Finance Proclamation No. 586/1990 on writing off capital assets. However, it is important to know that Paragraph 4 of Section 28 of Law No. 389/1990 makes it possible, within the first three years, to apply the following writeoff levels:

- For buildings and structures in the first year of writeoff, up to 20 percent; in the second year, up to 15 percent; and in the third year, up to 10 percent.
- For other basic assets, in the first writeoff year, up to 40 percent; in the second writeoff year, up to 30 percent; and in the third writeoff year, up to 20 percent.

The following are also considered to be expenditures: interest on loans and credits for the acquisition, reconstruction, and modernization of capital assets, expenditures for advertising which directly advertise the entrepreneurial agricultural activity involved, expenditures for representational activities, up to 1 percent of total revenues (for example, refreshments while negotiating with business partners, the purchase of evening clothes, etc.), health insurance and social security insurance, insurance payments to the Czech State Insurance Company, expenditures connected with the use of a personal motor vehicle in conducting agricultural entrepreneurial activities. The latter expenditures can be documented in two methods. They are either stipulated in accordance with the proclamation on travel compensation (Proclamation No. 33/1984, in the text of Proclamation No. 251/1990 and No. 338/1990) as a combination of the number of kilometers traveled and the rate per kilometer, or the entrepreneur can consider his personal motor vehicle as a capital asset. Expenditures are then the writeoffs, the costs of fuel, oil, and repairs to the vehicle. In both cases, it is necessary to keep records of official travel by a demonstrably clear method.

On the other hand, expenditures cannot include the costs of the taxpayer's personal consumption and that of his family, remuneration paid to the spouse of the taxpayer, expenditures connected with sanctions or the loss of property, and expenditures for acquiring, reconstructing, and modernizing capital assets. Deducted expenditures can also not include the costs expended for those agricultural products the entrepreneur consumes directly and the production of which, expressed in monetary terms, is obviously not even a part of the taxpayer's revenues.

Standards of Profitability

The last variant above for establishing the tax base is asserted by taxpayers who engage in agricultural activities on plots of land, the tax base of which must be at least at the level of the combination of the average standard of profitability per hectare of agricultural land and the overall size of all land plots suitable for agricultural cultivation. (To the extent to which this involves production in unheated greenhouses and foil-covered greenhouses, the tax base must be at a level of at least 10 times the average standard of profitability, that is to say, its actual assessment is multiplied by 10, and in heated greenhouses and foil-covered greenhouses, it is at least 50 times the average standard of profitability, that is to say, the actual assessment is multiplied by 50.)

The average standards of profitability per hectare of agricultural land are dependent upon the production economic group (PEG) into which the land plots are classified (see Table 1).

Table 1

PEG	Average Standard Profitability (Kcs/ha)
1-10	6,000
11-20	5,000
21-30	4,000
31-42	3,000

In this case, the overall size of the land plot, according to the status as of 31 December, is decisive and the tax is assessed according to it or up to the day activity ceases during the year. Pastures—to the extent to which the regulations on protecting the agricultural land fund did not require them to be changed over to fallow land—are assessed at two-tenths of the actual assessment; economically utilized waterways are assessed at three-tenths of the actual assessment.

As far back as 28 August 1991, we analyzed, on this page, the manner in which this way of assessing the tax base for a farmer works as a disadvantage for him in comparison with other private entrepreneurs by not making it possible for the farmer to show a loss based on his activities.

In our view, a private farmer should maintain single-entry books even for this method, even though it does not tie in directly with bookkeeping activities.

To the extent to which a married couple engages in agricultural activities, the tax base is divided in half if they engage in these activities as their principal mode of employment. In other cases (for example, where such activities for a married couple are secondary employment or where it is primary employment for one and secondary for the other partner of the marriage), the joint tax base can be divided into at least 70 percent for one of the members of the couple and a maximum 30 percent for the other.

From the established tax base, established by one of the above four methods, it is further possible to subtract the so-called deductible components which, according to Section 10 of the Law on Income Tax, are as follows:

- 1,200 korunas [Kcs] for every completed and begun calendar month during which the taxpayer engages in his activities and his revenues are subject to taxation, provided he does so as his principal employment, but at least Kcs6,000 per year.
- Kcs6,000 annually for taxpayers who engage in agricultural production or in entrepreneurial activities other than those who assert their claims in accordance with Letter a) above.

c) Kcs1,000 annually for other taxpayers not listed under Letter a) or b).

d) Kcs6,000 annually for taxpayers who maintain at least one child in a joint household. We stress the words "at least" which means that the taxpayer deducts Kcs6,000 only once, even though he is maintaining more than one child. We further draw attention to the fact that this deductible component may not be applied if tax relief already exists for maintaining a child (children)—in other words, for example, if the taxpayer engages in this activity as a secondary employment and if his principal employment revenues are taxed and tax advantaged for purposes of maintaining a child or if the husband or wife of the taxpayer already asserts this claim in his or her employment.

e) Kcs3,000 annually for taxpayers who pay court-approved or court-ordered child support for one child or Kcs6,000 annually for a taxpayer paying this kind of child support for two or more children.

f) Kcs6,000 annually for a taxpayer who maintains a wife (husband) in a common household whose personal income during the calendar year did not exceed Kcs14,400 (in determining personal income, the increase in pension for feeble-mindedness, for child support payable to a child, for supplemental payments for children and educational payments, for parental contributions to offset the requirements of a child in foster care, and for stipends made available for the duration of training for a future profession, as long as this stipend is not in the form of earnings replacements), are disregarded.

g) Kcs6,000 annually, if the payee is the recipient of a disability or other pension, with one of the conditions for granting it being the recognition of a disability or where the taxpayer is considered to be a disabled citizen in the opinion of a social security evaluation commission, according to special regulations.

h) Kcs3,000 annually, if the taxpayer is the recipient of a partial disability pension or other pension granted as a result of the recognition of partial disability or where the taxpayer is deemed to be partially disabled by a social security evaluation commission, according to special regulations.

Among others, it is possible to deduct the value of gifts made by the taxpayer to domestic legal entities for scientific purposes as well as for educational purposes, charitable gifts, gifts for social, health, and ecological reasons, gifts to support the development of culture, physical training and sports, and payments donated to communities. In this manner, it is possible to deduct a maximum of 10 percent of the basic tax, even in the event the actual value of the gift is higher.

The tax on income derived from agricultural production, including the basic amounts deductible from the tax, is shown in Table 2.

Table 2		
Income		Tax
More Than Kcs	Up to Kcs	
	60,000	15% of tax base
60,000	180,000	Kcs9,000 + 25% of tax base in excess of Kcs60,000
180,000	540,000	Kcs39,000 + 35% of tax base in excess of Kcs 180,000
540,000	1,080,000	Kcs165,000 + 45% of tax base in excess of Kcs540,000
1,080,000	And more	Kcs408,000 + 55% of tax base in excess of Kcs1,080,000

As has already been stated, tax returns must be submitted by 15 February of the following year. They are filed by everyone who has an annual income of more than Kcs1,000, using the prescribed form, which is available from finance offices. A completed form must be submitted even in cases where the taxpayer does not show a profit for the year, but has suffered a loss based on entrepreneurial activities and will, thus, not be paying taxes.

The tax is payable within a specified time limit after filing the tax return, that is to say, by 15 February, with taxpayers making estimated tax payments during the year. Whereas taxpayers engaged in other activities pay the same amounts quarterly, the estimated payments to be made by farmers, and the deadlines for their payments are set as follows, in view of the specifics involved in their type of income: by 30 April, 10 percent of the tax obligation for the previous tax year is due; by 31 August, 30 percent; and by 30 November, 40 percent. The remaining 20 percent is not paid and the taxpayer then reconciles the overall tax obligation for the year at the time of filing the next income tax return.

In certain cases, the payment of the tax can be deferred. This is so in cases where a private farmer is engaging in his activities as his main form of employment or if he is drawing an old-age or disability pension. In such a case, the obligation to pay taxes can be deferred in the first year to the extent of 60 percent of the tax, in the second year to the extent of 40 percent of the tax, and in the third year to the extent of 20 percent of the tax. If the taxpayer continues his activities for at least two more years from the time his tax obligation was deferred, and provided he expends at least the same amount of money equivalent to the deferred tax on developing his own activities, he is exempt from having to pay the balance of the tax.

In conclusion, we recommend that all taxpayers devote the necessary and appropriate care to determining their

tax obligations and making their payments. We do so for two reasons.

First, because each of these filings will be subjected to verification by employees of finance offices during the following year and, if shortcomings have occurred, these employees will require not only payment of the unpaid difference in the tax, but will also impose penalties which can be as high as 100 percent of this difference.

The second reason is that the tax filings and the established tax actually reflect the results of the entrepreneurial activities for the entire year.

It is understandable that not everyone who is a specialist in any kind of area of human activity, including agriculture, can be an expert in accounting and taxes. Every entrepreneur should, therefore, consider his capabilities ahead of time and agree on a consultation or having his entire bookkeeping and tax agenda worked out by consultants in that given discipline.

FIDESZ Critical of President, SZDSZ
92CH0131A Budapest MAGYAR NARANCS
in Hungarian 9 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by Gyorgy Such: "Who Makes Appointments in the End? Who Gets the Last Laugh?"]

[Text] Rumors are that the idea of having Arpad Goncz as president of the Republic did not occur to leaders of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], but to the intrepid Jozsef Antall himself. They say that he, personally, offered the exchange to Janos Kis and Peter Tolgyessy, thus yielding the highest public office expressly to Arpad Goncz, his childhood friend. But regardless of how it came about, the transition by all means benefited both sides: Although indirectly, the SZDSZ benefited by having dropped in its lap the head of state function, while Jozsef Antall got rid of the rather depressing thought of having to create a president of the Republic out of Lajos Fur or perhaps Gyorgy Szabad next(?) to him or above(?) him, (thus also creating a serious potential competitor within the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]).

As time passed after reaching the pact the coalition and opposition parties courageously chewed out each other day in and day out, the way that should be done. Meanwhile, due to his likable human characteristics, Arpad Goncz rapidly became the nation's Uncle Remus. In those days he was loved and respected equally by every party seated in parliament and by almost every member of every party faction. Then, sadly, Jozsef Antall had to become disappointed with his protege. The Csoori Affair in which Arpad Goncz had to sign a condemning statement came first, followed by the taxi blockade, which included an undoubtedly unfortunate partial sentence concerning suspension of governmental price increases [as published], the bickering at Visegrad, the (forced) resignation of army commander in chief Kalman Lorincz and the refusal to accept his resignation, and, finally, the refusal to appoint the chairmen of television and radio.

The head of our government, said to be a Christian government, drew all the necessary conclusions: Antall's fellow boy scout was no longer the old buddy, and, accordingly, Antall had hatched under his (not so generous) body a snake, moreover, a kind of snake the liberal-Bolsheviks put a spell on. Antall might have had confidence at the beginning that this would not work out the way it had. The vice presidential issue in particular wore down his poor, gray head. No one before had dared to break with him in the plain view of the greater public. Accordingly, the president of our ministers decided to put an end to playing games and hardened up.

Antall hardened up because in the aftermath of the Constitutional Court decision he impertinently submitted to Arpad Goncz an unchanged roster of nominees for television and radio vice chairmen, and this made it clear that beans were no longer at stake in the game. At that point the issue of whether the government wanted to

appoint quasi-commissars to head the public service media based on a forgotten (and not deregulated) legal provision had been transcended. An unruly head of state having to learn a lesson once and for all had also become an issue: Whoever acted contrary to the great chieftain became finite, it had to have an end just like a stick. In order to teach this lesson the head of state had to be humiliated as a human being, he had to be forced to throw ashes on his head, to acknowledge that he had exceeded his authority, and to sign the appointments with his tail between his legs and preferably with a smile. And the next time the head of state should remember for his own sake the lesson he had learned. And then he would either brake in or resign; the latter would be preferable because it was better to get rid of traitors the short way.

Arpad Goncz' situation is not made easier by the fact that party people who speak for the SZDSZ often make him (hopefully falsely) appear as something the MDF and its government have always claimed ever since the number of conflicts had increased: i.e., that the head of state had not conducted himself commensurate with his legal authority and with his status that placed him above the parties, but that instead he was following partisan directions received from the SZDSZ. It has become increasingly difficult to dispel this idea in the mind of the "restless force," which is more than inclined to listen to conspiracy theories since the SZDSZ had changed its earlier position and began to slowly favor an institution of "medium strength" in the office of the president of the Republic. This shift in gravity within the largest opposition party not only brought the manifestations of Arpad Goncz in "ill repute" and raised concern not only from the standpoint of constitutional law, but it also appeared to be somewhat shortsighted. As if the SZDSZ leaders had forgotten to consider the fact that it was by far not so certain that henceforth they would love every president of the Republic the same way as they liked this one. And it was equally not obvious that the army would become "more liberal" if it was managed by reenlisted sergeants and people who eat sunflower seeds, than by government held to account by parliament. (The actual commander in chief status of the president of the Republic means something like this.)

The strings became further intertwined by the fact that Arpad Goncz had gained practice during the past year and a half in "acting like a president." Recently he has frequently announced that indeed he would not be a weak president. This sounds a bit comic because it would be hard to imagine that Arpad Goncz was not aware of his own status under constitutional law. And if he was unaware of this, it would not hurt if someone would enlighten him in this regard. Irrespective of the path the Constitutional Court chose in this instance, and irrespective of its future decisions, Arpad Goncz would never be a strong president of the Republic (and not even one of "medium strength"), as long as the present Constitution was in force. The Opposition Roundtable had worked on this issue for many long months, and this issue also

required a popular referendum. Had FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] and SZDSZ actions in this regard failed in those days, we would now have a semipresidential system (at best), whose head would be named Imre Pozsgay. He would put things in order, for sure, if parties were to quarrel—but let us not deal with nightmares.

The “weakness” of the president of the Republic does not mean, of course, that he has nothing else to do but shake hands with the Albanian ambassador, tour Zimbabwe and Patagonia, and in Hungary to dedicate a ward at the Simagoronyos hospital while signing everything that is placed in front of him. Indeed, on however narrow a scale, there exist certain issues in regard to which the president of the Republic has the authority to evaluate matters, and in which his consensus-seeking role becomes prominent in times of peace. Such opportunities present themselves primarily under Paragraph 29 Section (1) of the Constitution (“... shall watch over the democratic functioning of the state organization”), which constitutes a general authorization of the president to decide what he regards as a threat to democracy. In this regard he is accountable only to the political public (and to his own conscience).

And let us say only as much about Jozsef Antall's psychic tricks and resignation maneuvers as has been said by the great deregulator and eternal technocrat Tamas Sarkozy to Arpad Goncz, according to malicious rumors: “Come on, come on, Mr. President, you have once already been sentenced to death! How little is this compared to that?!”

MDF Parliamentary Leader Causes New ‘Storm’

92CH0144A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 29 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by B.S. and A.F.: “The Opposition Disputes New Statements by Konya”]

[Text] MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] faction leader Imre Konya once again whipped up a storm with statements made at an MDF meeting in Csongrad County. He reassessed Imre Nagy's role in the 1956 revolution and also made peculiar statements about FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats]. Our reporters asked [representatives] Imre Mecs (SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]) and Laszlo Kover (FIDESZ) about certain statements that were part of the Konya speech.

Imre Mecs, SZDSZ:

“I recall how radical Imre Konya was in his May 1989 demand to reassess Imre Nagy's role. One could also agree today with the idea that the past had to be explored, but one could not start working with passion and with bias.”

In the SZDSZ representative's view the image we must formulate about Imre Nagy must be at least as detailed as the complicated political circumstances were in which

Nagy pursued his work. Considering his career path, there can be no doubt that Nagy was one of the outstanding personalities of Hungarian progression; on the other hand, there can be no doubt about his loyalty to the party either. And even if his life's work amounts to no more than what he did in 1953 to liquidate Stalinism, he remains one of the significant personalities of this century's Hungarian history. He liquidated internment camps, discontinued the list of kulaks, and took action against illegal court judgments. In contrast, Imre Konya's presentation in Csongrad was biased; it fundamentally contradicted the findings of objective analyses. Quite visibly, there is an increasing number of extremist distortions and false assessments. It seems as if everyone wants to expropriate the values of 1956 for himself. In Imre Mecs' view Imre Konya's assessment is more dangerous than false rumors that had been spread earlier which, for example, tried to link Imre Nagy's name to the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. Those rumors appeared to be Bolshevik provocations at the time, but Imre Konya's evaluation is superficial and biased; it may be regarded as a manifestation that distorts the 1956 values and as intent to expropriate those.

Laszlo Kover, FIDESZ:

Imre Konya is a good name in the legal profession, therefore it is inconceivable that he would not have legal arguments relative to what FIDESZ had to say about the Zetenyi-Takacs legislative proposal, Laszlo Kover said in prefacing his reactions to the MDF faction leader's remarks in Csongrad. The FIDESZ politician added that he did not want to argue with the statements made in Csongrad insofar as FIDESZ was concerned, in part because it would be very difficult for him to conduct a low level discourse, and in part because he felt that everyone, and the opposition in particular, must be careful about not being carried away by passions that some people endeavor to incite. For this reason Kover would suggest to all opposition parties to await calmly, in a staid and civilized manner the passing of the “siege” launched by certain politicians. In response to Konya's critical remarks about FIDESZ Kover said that although they could argue in a different way, a way Imre Konya is certainly familiar with, the fact that their arguments presented in parliament resemble more the style of law professors than that of miners at Zsilvolgy is still preferable.

Miners Trade Union, MSZP Agree To Cooperate

92CH0144C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
29 Oct 91 p 5

[Unattributed article: “Miners' Overture Toward the Left”]

[Text] A news release issued after Monday's meeting of the miners' trade union and the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] revealed that while the mining industry

dismissed workers by the hundreds, about 2,000 Ukrainian and Polish guest miners have been working in the depths of Hungarian shafts.

At the trade union's request, MSZP Chairman Gyula Horn and BDSZ [Mining Industry Trade Union Federation] President Antal Schalkhammer agreed last Monday to negotiate a common mining and energy industry concept for the two organizations. The BDSZ found that it was hopeless to pursue a trade union movement devoid of politics at a time when the Left, represented by the MSZP, was close to the interest group activities pursued by the miners. The BDSZ would not become a socialist trade union, but based on an appropriate agreement, it would form an organizational cooperative alliance with the MSZP, a party prepared to represent employee interests in parliament. The two organizations established a working committee to prepare such an agreement; negotiations will begin Friday.

The mining industry's strategy will be streamlined between the two organizations by another newly established committee. The trade union presented shocking facts to representatives of the MSZP at the first meeting. These included claims according to which the government was "hastening" the mining industry "to be engaged in liberal market competition," while it is commonly known that all mining enterprises—gravel, bauxite, and coal—are at the brink of bankruptcy. The trade union claimed that coal cartels are being established throughout the world, that an increase in prices may be expected, and that therefore counterdevelopment measures in Hungary are mistaken. One cannot convert overnight 1.5 million households from using coal to some other energy source, and therefore it would be more appropriate to develop an energy policy based on modern, Hungarian-based materials.

We learned from MSZP spokesman Sandor Csintalan that they, too, were surprised by the announcement according to which there was a shortage of skilled underground workers at a time when workers are being laid off, and that this shortage is being remedied by employing 2,000 Ukrainian and Polish workers. This shortage of skilled underground workers is no coincidence: The net earnings of a well-trained master miner forced to work 340 days annually amount to no more than 25,000 forints. Five shafts would have to be shut down immediately in the absence of the guest workers.

Sanatorium for Chernobyl Children Opposed

*92CH0144B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 4 Nov 91 p 6*

[Article by Antal Andrassy: "Children From Chernobyl at Hajmasker?"]

[Text] The largest base of the Soviet military temporarily "stationed" in the Transdanubian region for 45 years has been at Hajmasker, which had already been an infamous military garrison prior to the war. Making use of the vacated buildings presents no small concern to the local government; negotiations have been underway with dozens of foreign and Hungarian entrepreneurs. All of them wanted to pick and choose only the buildings in the best condition; those in bad condition would have been left behind as a burden to the local government.

A few months ago, however, a bidder expressed interest in purchasing the entire military compound and in renewing public utility provisions so that various services would also be provided to local residents. The villager residents, however, do not want to accept this bidder, as that turned out at the latest, rather stormy village meeting at Hajmasker.

The bidder is called the Byelorussian-Hungarian Chernobyl Heritage Fund, which intends to establish a sanatorium for Byelorussian children in the former military complex.

Byelorussian representatives of the Foundation have already signed a letter of intent based on which they would utilize the entire camp along with appropriate financial and health care guarantees. But the villagers are concerned about implementing the otherwise noble purposes of the plan; they would not like to populate the future sanatorium with children arriving from Byelorussia. Their fears could not be dispelled either by experts, physicians and radiation biologists present at the meeting, or by local government officials arguing in support of the plan based on the soundness of the investment, even though these arguments held out the promise of possible new workplaces resulting from the planned introduction of natural gas. In response to numerous counterarguments the village meeting asked the local government to call a popular referendum to decide the matter. The date of the referendum will be established at the next meeting of the village legislature.

Commentary Calls For Continuing Economic Reforms

92EP0070A Warsaw *PRAWO I ZYCIE* in Polish
No 44, 2 Nov 91 pp 1, 7

[Article by Roman Kruszewski: "A Pact for the Third Republic: Poland at a Crossroads"]

[Text] The consequences of the elections will answer the question of whether our country will join the posttotalitarian Spain, Greece, and Portugal, which found a place for themselves in the European Community, or whether it will join the postcommunist Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia, which scurry among empty store shelves in search of a road to prosperity. The 460 deputies of the 11th Sejm face a challenge whose resolution (or nonresolution) will determine Poland's fate for many years ahead.

The tragic fragmentation of forces consequent to the elections is a result of the apprehensions of politicians and the confusion of voters. Politicians all the time fear to tell the public the truth about the burden that it has to shoulder en route to normalcy. Here the reason why the Communists had lost power is worth recalling. Without detracting from the contributions of Solidarity, the two principal reasons were: first, permission from Big Brother [the Soviet Union] and second, the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] was unable to gain social support for handling the needed reform of the economy. So the burden of that handling fell on the shoulders of Solidarity.

Yet, rescuing Poland from the quagmire into which it was sunk by the more than 40-year-old scientific-utopian experiment with the socialist economy requires efforts and sacrifices on a historic scale. It is easy to damage something but difficult to repair it. The Balcerowicz Plan is the foundation of the reform. It provides for measures that any government desiring to bring about a normal, that is, a capitalist economy would pursue. To learn what is awaiting Poland if it follows that road, suffice it to consider the former GDR. Over there the Balcerowicz Plan is being introduced at a much faster pace. Within a year all the large and supposedly modern plants have collapsed, the unemployment rate is in tens of percent, extremists such as neofascists have appeared, and people are attending protest rallies. But as of mid-1990 the signals from the other side of the Odra River indicate that the decline of output has been halted and the economy is beginning to grow. The Germans in the former GDR already are aware of the coming prosperity.

The former GDR differs from Poland in that it has a strong currency and is the recipient of a huge influx of capital. In our country, in contrast, a strong zloty is barely beginning to arise and the capital influx is limited. However, that influx will broaden considerably once

foreign investors are convinced that the Polish government is determined to carry through changes and, once ordinary people believe that ultimately this approach will pay off.

Yet, the results of the elections have already caused a 20-percent decline in the credibility of Poland (that being the extent by which the price of our debt has declined on the world's stock exchanges). Hence, confidence in our country as one in which it is worthwhile to spend money has declined.

Thus, politicians should finally gather the courage to tell the truth: Things are bad because they have to be bad. It cannot be otherwise at the present stage of economic restructuring. They also should point to the need to shut down large plants which merely devour public wealth, and to the need for one-half of the peasantry to switch to other jobs. Furthermore, they should point out that everybody will be jobless unless new jobs are simultaneously created—which only capital, especially foreign capital, can provide.

Otherwise, voters shall continue to believe in such absurdities as: the "third road" (the sole rationally operating system in the world is the capitalist market economy); the need to rescue state-owned industry (the sooner the large plants are shut down the better off their employees will be, because the need to privatize factories will arise); the dignity of the worker, in the Christian dignity of the employee (it is the citizens of prosperous countries who have dignity); and decommunization (it was Balcerowicz who contributed most to it in his attempts to transform the irrational, Communist structure of the economy).

On the occasion, let me say a little about the Communists, or, if you prefer, as they call themselves nowadays, social democrats. It is time to abandon the illusion that settling accounts with the heirs of the PZPR will cure all ills. There is no such thing as historical justice. Cimoszewicz, Kwasniewski, and Miller will not pay for Bierut's crimes, for Gomulka's criminal provincialism, or for Gierek's mistaken economic policy, so pregnant in catastrophic consequences. On the contrary, they may become among the prime movers of capitalist changes. Capitalism in Japan was built by *nomenklatura* companies formed by the former officials of the feudal imperial court. Let Sekula, Wilczek, or Miller enrich themselves, because, what matters most, they thereby also create new jobs for others.

To return to the principal conclusion, one result of the elections to the Sejm is that the president may exercise greater personal proreform clout. He shall have to shoulder a huge responsibility, unless some of it is previously accepted by the deputies if they reach an agreement on the most important question—that of continuing the Balcerowicz Plan. In face of this issue all the other issues become secondary. Here it would be worth it for the political parties to reach a mutual agreement for the sake of the Third Republic. We shall see soon whether among us there are enough politicians

capable of abandoning personal political ambitions for the sake of the country's good.

Mitsubishi Corporation Visits Poland

92EP0059B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 23 Oct p 1

[Article by D.W.: "Japan Becomes Acquainted With Our Economy"]

[Text] "In Japan there are 1.4 million private enterprises that are afraid to invest in Poland because they consider that investing money in your country is highly risky. The Japanese always choose the best terms," said Shinroku Morohashi, president of the Mitsubishi Corporation, who visited Poland as the head of the Japanese Trade-Industrial Chamber mission. This group of businessmen numbering more than 40 people is visiting Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary from 19 October until 28 October to acquire more information about the economy in our countries, in the words of Mr. Morohashi.

"Japanese investments in Poland are small because we are separated by too great a distance," says Mr. Morohashi. "The United States is much closer. For this reason we ought to look for economic partners among our neighbors, above all, especially since we have good relations with them," advises the president of the Mitsubishi Corporation. "The signing of an agreement associating our country with the EEC will also be good news for investors. If serious investments do come into Poland, they will be from the West."

Meanwhile, we continue to be a significant selling market for the Japanese. No sensible manufacturer can ignore this fact. Mr. Morohashi said that the current visit and contacts with the National Economic Chamber are the result of the visit of Prime Minister Bielecki to Japan in June 1991. During their stay in Poland, the Japanese signed an economic agreement with the National Economic Chamber. The purpose of this agreement is to stimulate economic and trade exchange between our countries. As *RZECZPOSPOLITA* has already reported, the Japanese mission was received by President Lech Walesa and Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki.

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 20-26 Oct 91

92EP0068A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 43,
26 Oct 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

The new retirement and pension law should go into effect on 1 November 1991 if the president signs it. In the end there were 150 votes for, 129 against, and 68 abstentions. The chamber adopted the government proposal with the Senate corrections. This variant is the least favorable for retirees and pensioners: it is estimated that the 3.7 million individuals with the lowest benefits

gain; while 1.4 million with the highest benefits will stay at current levels. Under the new system, given earnings equal to the average wage and 30 years of work, a retirement will be 1.071 million zlotys [Z]. The law significantly restricts retirees' and pensioners' ability to earn. There is to be a limitation of the basis, or the earnings used to determine the level of benefits, to 250 percent of the average wage. The law is to be in effect through the end of 1993. The OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement] sent an appeal to the president that he not sign the law and said that if the president signs it, the unionists will contest the act before the Constitutional Tribunal as a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and of the worker rights contained in collective labor agreements and in the industrial charters. Numerous union organizations asked for a presidential veto.

The Sejm adopted a law ratifying the Polish-German agreement on being good neighbors. There were 182 votes for, 26 against, and 60 abstentions.

The 250th Conference of the Polish Episcopate asked the faithful to vote for the Christian groups: "Only political groups that clearly support defense of human life from the moment of conception, that respect the right of the family, that show concern for Poland in their actions and respect for its traditions deriving from Christian roots should receive a vote from the faithful to establish laws and seek the common good of the Republic." [passage omitted]

Lot [Polish Air Lines] has ordered nine Boeing planes (four in the 400 version for 147 passengers and five in the 500 version for 108 passengers). The value of the contract is \$300 million. Lot is the largest user of Boeing aircraft in East Europe. [passage omitted]

The oath of military service according to the version presented in the Sejm: "I, a soldier of the Polish Army, promise to serve loyally my fatherland, the Polish Republic, to defend always its independence and borders. To stand on guard for the constitution and the law, to be faithful to the president of the Republic, to execute carefully the commands of superiors, to observe the regulations. To guard the honor of the Polish soldier, to defend without hesitation the military banner. In the interest of my Fatherland in need of my own blood not to spare my life, so to live and to die as a true Polish soldier." A soldier can add these words to the oath: "So help me God," but the words do not appear in the text itself. [passage omitted]

Polish-German Reconciliation will be the name of a foundation that will deal with help for the victims of Nazi crimes. The government of the FRG will give 500 million German marks [DM] to the foundation in accord with an agreement between the governments. According to information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are 40,000 former inmates of concentration camps and 500,000 to 600,000 former forced laborers living in Poland.

At the request of GAZETA WYBORCZA, the Sopot Institute for Sociological Research has conducted a survey on a sample of 1,014 individuals from all over Poland: 34.9 percent of the respondents said that the new Sejm will be better than the current one; 8.6 percent, that it will be worse; 5.7 percent, that it will be as good; 15.1 percent, that it will be as bad; and 35.7 percent had no opinion. Of the respondents, 51 percent want to vote for a party that intends "to privatize the economy as quickly as possible, because thanks to that it will be more effective," but 45 percent support parties that want "to delay privatization because it threatens even greater unemployment." Of the respondents, 60 percent would support a party that "wants to halt the purchase of Poland by foreign capital"; 35 percent, parties that want "to bring foreign capital to Poland as quickly as possible." Sixty-six percent support parties that intend to limit the influence of the church on public life; 25 percent, parties that want to increase its influence. In settling accounts with the communists: 48 percent support parties that want "to settle accounts only of those communists who violated the law"; 39 percent those that want "to take assets and power from communists who still have them"; 10 percent support groups which "do not intend to settle with the communists because that is a witch hunt." [passage omitted]

After a visit by Gen Ramon Fernandez, commander of the Air Forces of Spain, a spokesman for the Polish Air Forces and Air Defense Forces said that the Spanish want to buy the Polish W-3 Sokol helicopter for military purposes.

Andrzej Witkowski, the prosecutor who is dealing with the murder of Father J. Popieluszko, declared: "We know who was the immediate superior of Ciasion and Platek, but in view of the good of the investigation we are not making the name public. General Kiszczak is not a suspect in the case." [passage omitted]

The Regulation Commission of the Sejm has suspended proceedings in the case of immunity for Deputies Mieczyslaw Gil and five others, including Jozef Lubieniecki (both of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club [OKP]). Members of the leadership of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDRP), who wanted to put him before a court in conjunction with an accusation that they made contact with the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover in the USSR, asked that M. Gil be suspended. The commission took the position that if the deputy candidates are not elected to the new Sejm they will be subject to normal court procedures, but if they are elected the future Sejm commission will take up their case.

It was decided at the Saturday session of the Extraordinary National Congress of Student Self-Governments, being held at the Main School of Trade in Warsaw, that if the government does not initiate talks, students of the

higher schools throughout the nation will probably begin a strike. The protest is directed against a decree of the Council of Ministers according to which funds for material support for students are earmarked not just for payment of stipends and aid, but also for the costs of maintenance, including renovations of dormitories and, thus, it will even be necessary to pay Z1 million each month.

On 19 October 1991, former soldiers of the Wehrmacht and their families participating in an election campaign meeting of the German minority in Gorny Slask with candidates for the parliament prepared a memorandum to the presidents of the Republic of Poland and the FRG: Lech Walesa and Richard von Weizsaecker. They asked for support for their proposals, and they wrote the memorandum aroused "by the main program idea: to join Poles and Germans on the way to Europe—in full respect for the authorities of the Republic of Poland and the FRG." [passage omitted]

Opinions

Father Prof. Jozef Tischner:

(GAZETA WYBORCZA 22 October 1991)

"I have been asked what are my criteria for selection. I will answer... I cross out all the misfortunates who wherever they stand things collapse and whatever they touch falls apart. And there are such people. The state is, however, too important an institution to give its helm to those who are lifelong failures.... I cross out those who promise that thanks to them I will be better off. They do not see the condition of the patient. I support those who say it will be difficult, but with common sense....

"And finally one more thing, for there will not be another opportunity. I feel for those who win this election."

Jan Olszewski:

(Interviewed by Andrzej Witold Halicki, KONFRONTACJE, September 1991)

[Halicki] You have been mentioned several times as a candidate for prime minister.

[Olszewski] I have had enough of the speculation as a result of the fact that I once undertook such a mission. I simply do not think about it.

[Halicki] But if such a situation arose would you take the responsibility upon yourself?

[Olszewski] One cannot answer such a question in advance. I have never sought it, and I am not seeking it. That is a position that will not bring spectacular successes. In Poland's condition, given the very unclear, complicated future, one also cannot answer in the negative in an unambiguous manner. [passage omitted]

Recent Focus on Irredentism Government Diversion

92BA0112D Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 24 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Petre Mihai Bacanu: "A Trip to the Past"]

[Text] How do you most rapidly draw attention away from the miners' performance, from the Moldova business, from shortages of all kind, and from poor economic management? It's simple: by directing it toward Budapest and raising every minor incident to the level of a national tragedy. What if the story about the government in exile of some harmless paranoids did not work, let's start another one, another smoke screen! And if Petre Roman adopts a position about the Szeklers, it will be easier to place him back in orbit together with his party.

If belittling Timisoara "worked" in Parliament, why shouldn't a living example lesson about the injuries inflicted by the Hungarians not "hold" as well, to prove that we are patriotic. What does it matter if hundreds of Timisoarans have died; the only important thing is the four Szekler militiamen. With just a little more effort the miners' descent on Bucharest might have been blamed on the Hungarians.

There is no question that in the Szekler story, the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] should blame its own extremists, just as we blame our extremists, and that it could have reacted more rapidly to what is happening with the "Szekler Country" diversion. But they should not have exaggerated on the basis of a casual word from a nobody, especially since immediately afterward 1,000 of his people repudiated it. So that's how the national problem has remained at the extremist level, and the administration wants to take advantage of it, to harvest it, overlooking the danger of being pointed at and ridiculed by the international community. What took place in our hysterical Parliament was nothing else than a court which accused and sent a minority to sit in the corner. It seems that this spectacle will continue today in Parliament.

The danger in fact is neocommunism, xenophobic communism, the stupidity of our leaders, and not the Romanian-Hungarian conflict. At a time when the leaders should account to the nation for the economic disaster, the attention of public opinion is distracted with the Hungarian threat and with persistent buzzing about irredentism. Things that happened nearly two years ago are just presented now, because these gentlemen needed to inflame a whole country. And here we are, with serious economic problems that have degenerated into nationalist extremism. Isolated or nonexistent cases have been immediately generalized.

I was talking to a young man from Sfintu Gheorghe, Mihai Roca, 20 years old: "As a Romanian I was amazed to learn that Romanians are driven out of town. They left

from everywhere, for instance, professors whose families were hundreds of kilometers away. There might have been isolated cases of persecution, but we live in peace with the Hungarians. We were hearing strange things, like that they were playing soccer with the heads of Romanians, and we all laughed, Romanians and Hungarians. Here, in 'Szekler Country,' we remain calm and look at television with disbelief. What's more, we constantly remind ourselves that the Szeklers fought at Podul Inalt in 1475, alongside Stefan cel Mare to defend Moldova, and at Calugareni, together with Mihai Viteazu to defend the Romanian nation."

On the very evening when Parliament was inflaming the nation with its pernicious, instigating phraseology regarding "Szekler Country," and irresponsibly called on the Army to occupy the two counties, there on television was Mr. Roman, involved in a fierce, communist-style electoral campaign, attempting to recover something from the Transylvanians' loyalty to the FSN [National Salvation Front]. So now the ex-premier has woken up, and goes on an on, indignant over the persecutions to which the Romanians are subjected (!), but not a word about what he did for two years, about why he didn't proceed to a legal trial of the violence to uncover the guilty. Not one serious investigation, and now he's indignant! In the meantime, together with pathetic declarations, Parliament presents a dusty report, leaving the whole country in a fog; does it intend to carefully and objectively analyze each separate case, to openly hear the alleged guilty parties, to eliminate ambiguities and pretense? Why just now, and why not through the legal system? It boggles the mind: Parliament's prattle is categorized as "exceptionally valuable facts" voiced "at a crucial moment in Romania's destiny" and invoking "the preservation of the national essence" through communist nationalism. According to these gentlemen our poor little country is on the threshold of war, of an assault, and so they call upon those who are spending their time in lines to join the fold of the national struggle, thrusting them even further into a two-bit primitive Romanianism.

I thought I was travelling back in time when I saw Parliament frantically applauding the phantoms of the past. When Ceausescu would get all hot and bothered about irredentists, the national-communism cheerleaders would stand up in their seats. That's what happened at the "Greater Romania" Party Congress which debated the danger on Romania's borders. I wonder how some people can go to Ceausescu's grave and not once go by the December Heroes Cemetery. For me at least, who never concurred with the Ceausescus' execution, but who nonetheless cannot respect their memory, for me and many others like me, it is the shrine of our heroes that lives in our hearts, of those killed in the mountains, of those killed in December.

Those who revive nationalist movements have proven that the great conflagrations are started by small sparks. To encourage a Vadim Tudor is tantamount to putting reason to sleep; by himself, he can cause more damage

than the Tartar hordes. A man infected by the gangrene of fanaticism and extremism is incurable, and only the trivialization of his hysteria can be effective, lest we achieve barbarities such as the miners' performance. The Romanians have begun to understand the aim of such magazines as ROMANIA MARE and EUROPA, which beyond their declared anti-Semitism and anti-Hungarianism, are also anti-Romanian. Thanks to them, we have succeeded, with no justification at all, to seem to the outside world as a nation of intolerance and barbarity. Anti-Semitism, chauvinism, exacerbated nationalism must conclusively be uprooted from our souls. It was enough for one of them to bay at the moon, to be joined by the rest, who also saw the Hungarian threat in the nebulous night. Garbage attracts more garbage.

Our break with the past and with the burden of our sad existence will come from the discreet and steady energy with which we will impose democracy, and not from nationalist incriminations.

From the depths of the national soul, we should extract only the noblest culture and aspirations, implanting their roots in our people rather than heighten the haziness of overheated minds which can only see vengeful Hungarians. We cannot, of course, accept separatist affinities, but neither can we accept exacerbated nationalism. We need a powerful Romania, with all the minorities which live on its land prospering together with the Romanian people.

The Greater Romania Party, which emerged in the right corner, is now clearly unseemly after the administration supported a Vadim Tudor. Anti-Semitism, fanaticism, extremism, are nothing else than the inventions of Securitate people specialized in this sort of diversion, and of a journalist who for all his life has fished in troubled waters. And the emergence of our emissaries in all the currents of accelerated and benign ultranationalism is preelectoral populism. Finding its voice and courage together with them, is the entire retrograde-nationalist wing of the political class which still has within the government enough people nostalgic for communism. On the other hand, the conversation of four people over a glass of wine assumes the proportions of political scandal. And gentlemen, who do you think looks better in the eyes of the outside world, which we are now imploring to give us one and a half million tons of wheat so that we will not starve this winter? Our prattlers or the reserved Hungarians?

As for the rest...

Miners Distrust FSN, Prefer United Opposition

92BA0112C Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 23 Oct 91 p 5

[Interview with Daniel Ababei, a miner, by Roxana Iordache; place and date not given: "Miners Who Have Been Shot Say 'I Fear Only God'"]

[Text] [Iordache] What did you have in mind in coming to Bucharest, Daniel Ababei?

[Ababei] To voice our demands.

[Iordache] And how did you happen to reach the Romanian Television station (Televiziune)?

[Ababei] To let Emanuel Valeriu come and tell whether Cosma gave his interview under pressure or not. Because that's what we were hearing, that he gave it under pressure. And nobody wanted to come. The riot troops began to throw tear gas grenades.

[Iordache] What was the opinion of your companions about the way Televiziune presented the situation?

[Ababei] Well, they knew they were lying. Nothing but lies.

[Iordache] And how were you wounded?

[Ababei] When they tried to get in with the excavator, nothing happened to me. I helped a woman with three children, standing two meters away from a grenade ready to explode; I threw the children down, dropped on top of them, then grabbed the grenade to throw it away and it exploded in my face. They took me to the Emergency Hospital (a man and a woman); I stayed a half-hour and went back. One hour after I got back to Televiziune, when I went past the crane that was trying to get into Televiziune, the man at the wheel saw that they were firing, gave up and kept going straight instead of turning to the right. I was running behind the crane; I heard a rumbling in my back and realized that I had been hit, I reached with my hand, saw that I was bleeding and didn't know what was going on. I wanted to run, I saw that I could not—the troops were coming, they would have crushed me—so I crawled past some four-story buildings and asked for help. A kid about 14 years of age, two women, and two men came out and took me to the Emergency Hospital in a car.

[Iordache] When did this happen?

[Ababei] The 26th to the 27th, at 0100 in the morning. Exactly at the time when I got to the hospital, 10 minutes after 0100, my daughter became three years old.

[Iordache] How many bullets did the Supreme Defense Council give you for a present?

[Ababei] Three or four, I'm not sure.

[Iordache] The operation extracted only one?

[Ababei] One, yes. From the right leg.

[Iordache] And they said that you had two more?

[Ababei] Yes, two or three. They are in the soft part....

[Iordache] What did the investigation find, is it a combat bullet?

[Ababei] Yes, it's a 7.62-caliber bullet from a submachine gun.

[Iordache] How were you treated at the hospital?

[Ababei] Very well. I didn't expect to be treated that well. The doctors Croitoru, Popescu, Bucur....

[Iordache] And what is your opinion of the treatment you received from the authorities?

[Ababei] They should not have opened fire, because we did nothing to them, absolutely nothing. They were the first to launch tear gas, chemicals....

[Iordache] And did you defend yourselves at that point?

[Ababei] We tried to defend ourselves, but didn't have any way to do it.

[Iordache] But you were still called "terrorists"?

[Ababei] Yes, instead of others.

[Iordache] Did you come here in June?

[Ababei] No.

[Iordache] How do you feel about what happened then, in June?

[Ababei] Then, in June, no one knew the truth about what happened in University Square. Now we have realized that we continue to be lied to. Then we were called saviours, now we are terrorists. Then, the miners went from Petrosani to Bucharest in four hours, they received food, drink. Now, they travelled for 12 hours, the power was turned off both at the pass and on the other side of Craiova. In Bucharest, they fired on us with combat bullets.

[Iordache] Why do you think such terrible things happen in our country?

[Ababei] Someone does not want to give up power, is clinging to his seat at all costs. For this seat, he fires on his own people.

[Iordache] Is there still communism in Romania?

[Ababei] I don't know how to answer that. Maybe yes, maybe no.

[Iordache] You still have to undergo another operation to remove the bullets. Until then, you have to return to the Jiu Valley. Where do you work?

[Ababei] At the Aninoasa mine.

[Iordache] Do you have an independent union there?

[Ababei] Yes.

[Iordache] Do you think you could have difficulties on the job?

[Ababei] No, I don't think so. We all came for the same purpose, with the same ideas.

[Iordache] Do you think there will be frictions between the miners, between those who came here and those who stayed back?

[Ababei] Yes, that's possible. There will be discussions: "You didn't come because you are cowards." "And you who went, what did you accomplish?"

[Iordache] How much do you earn a month?

[Ababei] Now I have been rehired, I barely started training and we went on a general strike, and then I came to Bucharest. But we negotiated a salary of 11,445. So far I have received nothing in hand, but I know from the others that the taxes are very high, 5,500 to 6,000.

[Iordache] You were hired and then you left?

[Ababei] Yes, I worked in the Jiu Valley, I went to school, and I left to take a job at CPL (Wood Processing Combine) Bacau. I was laid off there and went back to the mine. My wife and daughter stayed in Buhusi. She doesn't work.

[Iordache] What did you think of the reaction of the Bucharest people?

[Ababei] They were with us, they helped us. I noticed that the "hooligans" especially stood by our side, even though they were beaten up by the miners in June 1990, and those who cheered us then helped us now.

[Iordache] And what does that mean?

[Ababei] It means that we were lied to, that for no good reason we were turned against people we did not know. We didn't know the real situation in University Square from the "information" that we were getting in the Jiu Valley. We have now experienced on our own backs the results of the same disinformation, being called destabilizers just like the "hoodlums." We were just asking for our rights, just like they did. But Televiziune called them hoodlums, prostitutes, drug dealers. Now they said the same thing about us.

[Iordache] After being hospitalized, did anyone look in on you?

[Ababei] No. Only a few civilians from Bucharest (thanks to Maria Paunescu and Maria Andrei, especially the last, who was savagely beaten in June 1990, was arrested, taken to Magurele and butchered, so that she had to have an eighth operation after the seven that she already had on her abdomen). Otherwise, from the mine, from the combine, nobody.

[Iordache] Mr. Cosma told Mr. Iliescu that he will not leave Bucharest until he has a clear accounting of the men.

[Ababei] Maybe he did get it and left with it. We are still here.

[Iordache] Or maybe he received no accounting?

[Ababei] Here in the hospital, we have no way of knowing.

[Iordache] Do you still trust Miron Cosma?

[Ababei] Partially not.

[Iordache] What has caused you to partially lose your trust?

[Ababei] From what we hear, he is supposed to have made some arrangements with someone, to have been manipulated by him....

[Iordache] Is it true that Mr. Cosma came to Bucharest at the request of the miners?

[Ababei] Yes, that's true.

[Iordache] Were you there?

[Ababei] Yes, in Petrosani, at the House of Culture. Cosma did not mention coming to Bucharest, the miners asked for it and then he had no choice.

[Iordache] All sorts of names have been mentioned over here as those who backed your action. The name mentioned most often has been Verdet.

[Ababei] All I can tell you is that I would not have accepted to come to Bucharest in order to bring full fledged communism back to power. Reality is one thing, and what is said about reality from "above" is another. If we had to ask for our rights again, I would come back to Bucharest again.

[Iordache] Violently?

[Ababei] I don't see where there has been violence on our part this time. We didn't attack anyone and we should not have been attacked.

[Iordache] Did you expect to be received as you were?

[Ababei] No. In June, the miners were received entirely differently. Why didn't the administration tell them then that what they were doing was wrong? It got upset only now, because they came against it. Then, it was breaking the law to beat the people of Bucharest, students, their brothers. I would not have come to do that, that kind of division is a bad thing. The FSN [National Salvation Front] did it. It's guilty. For this reason, we miners have been put in a bad position. In the Jiu Valley, we didn't know the reasons for the demonstrations. I was sorry then, in June, for all that happened. The government leads from the shadows, those in power are laughing, and the others fight with each other.

[Iordache] Aren't you afraid to have your statements published in the paper?

[Ababei] I fear only God.

[Iordache] Why do you think others are afraid to talk?

[Ababei] They are afraid of the Securitate people, of the Communists.... In my view, the Securitate is still behind all this. All sorts of rumors and lies.

[Iordache] Do you still trust Televiziune?

[Ababei] No. And I didn't before. Not before, not after the revolution. Because I saw with my own eyes how it lies. During the revolution I was also at the Central Committee headquarters, and I confiscated a "terrorist" weapon. Where do you suppose it is today?

[Iordache] What do you think should be done to provide accurate information in this country? Should the Televiziune management be replaced with independent persons?

[Ababei] It doesn't help to change the management if it's controlled from the shadows. Somebody still controls from behind. Finally, you have to reach the root of the evil. We were "quiet" enough during the time of Ceausescu. If we don't join together we will rue the day, because whether this government falls or not, what was bad until now will only get worse! If the source of evil is not removed, we'll still have a sort of Roman government in the shape of a Stolojan government.

[Iordache] Do you think you have contributed to the fall of the government?

[Ababei] Very much so. To the actual fall, of course, but as I hear it, Roman still runs the government from the shadows, and that we don't like. We have accomplished nothing if the FSN still runs the government. We would have liked a coalition government.

[Iordache] Do you believe that anything has changed with the change in government?

[Ababei] Only the name has changed, what do you think, since the FSN is still in power?!

[Iordache] Do you still believe in promises?

[Ababei] I never believed them, and I still don't.

[Iordache] During the electoral campaign, the miners obtained greater material benefits than the other social categories. That is the reason why they came three times "to defend" the administration, while on the fourth time they came against it. New elections are getting closer; if new promises are made and you receive small advantages, are you ready to give up and vote for the FSN again?

[Ababei] No, I don't believe that anyone in the Jiu Valley is for the FSN now. The Jiu Valley no longer votes for The Rose.

[Iordache] Do you trust other parties?

[Ababei] It doesn't matter, and I certainly don't trust the FSN. I would trust the opposition parties if they ran as a united opposition, because then they would show us that neither of them is interested in power for its own sake, in

personal profit, but in a government for the good of the country and the people. I would like them to be all together in one bloc, under the same electoral emblem, so that they will win. We would then have some faith that we are not being deceived. Otherwise, whoever comes into the elections alone is coming after power.

[Iordache] Do you still trust Iliescu?

[Ababei] How can I trust someone who is laughing while I am riddled with bullets? On top of that, he's saying that we are accountable for their mistakes. I did not trust him and still don't. What would I have faith in? The lies he's telling us? All lies. Doesn't everybody clearly see the sorry state that Romania has reached in one year and eight months?

Living Conditions of Miners in Jiu Valley

92BA0110A Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 6 Oct 91 p A9

[Article by Mats Lundegard: "Wretched Life in Romania's Mining District"]

[Text] Petroseni—The autumn sun shines softly over the steep slopes around the Jiu River. The water rustles in the shallow bed. It is a very pretty scene. Until one takes a second look, sees the toxic foam, and realizes that the haze acting as a veil consists of industrial fumes. And until one talks to people and senses their poverty and misery. This was where the miners came from—the men who may have brought about Romania's ruin.

Most of Romania's coal is mined in the primitive mines around the Jiu Valley. It has given the men who toil underground a disproportionate amount of power in the country's affairs. They know something about the subject. Long before the revolution and long before Ceausescu, they tried to domineer the regime. They were being killed in clashes with police and soldiers as far back as the 19th century. And in 1929. And again in 1977.

Ran Amok

A week ago they were on the march again. Eight thousand of them took the train to Bucharest to protest physically against an austerity policy that was pushing their living standard down another notch. They ran amok in the streets of the capital, vandalized the government palace, and forced the prime minister to resign.

"We should have done it a long time ago," said a man outside the gate to the mine in Lupeni. "Their lies and double-dealing have been hurting us for many years. Pain has to come to an end."

He earns 10,000 lei per month. It was meager pay even last spring, he says. When the price increases triggered by the economic reforms took effect, his standard of living was eroded past the point where he could endure it:

"We live like animals. Our children live on black bread and heaven's charity. Why should I support leaders who

give us that? They are the same old tyrants as before—the same old Communists."

This was the fourth time since Nicolae Ceausescu's overthrow in 1989 that the miners had gone to Bucharest. The previous time was in June of last year, when they went there to punish demonstrating students and other critics of the regime who were said to be threatening law and order. The fighting in the city on that occasion resulted in the deaths of six people. They were protesting against the same leadership that the miners were in Bucharest to threaten this time.

When one talks to people in the small gray towns of the Jiu Valley, one can sense that they regret it now. And perhaps they are asking themselves: Were they duped into taking action and manipulated?

"No One Is Proud"

"No one is proud of what happened," said Ion Sezbanici, one of the union leaders in Vulcan. "But the responsibility lies with the government. It never explained to us what was happening. It promised us the moon, but in fact, everything has gotten worse."

He said that originally, the miners merely wanted Prime Minister Petre Roman to come talk to them and see with his own eyes the conditions in which they were living and working. He recalled that even Ceausescu had sent the head of his government to meet with the miners when they protested.

And I reminded him that on that occasion the miners had taken the said prime minister underground in order to lend force to their words. He smiled a little at the memory.

Big Losers

Silviu Brucan, who himself was part of the Romanian power elite before breaking with it and setting himself up as a gray eminence and political thinker in Bucharest, calls the miners' action a reminder that it is the workers who are the big losers as communism is dismantled in East Europe:

"Their action was an aggressive and brutal way of expressing an extremely reasonable concern about the way things were going," he says. "It is being demanded of them that they work better and more than before. They are being threatened with unemployment, which is every worker's worst nightmare—and previously an unfamiliar concept in their lives. At the same time, they see that the new entrepreneurs and the fixers are the ones benefiting from the reforms."

He says that Romania's miners have always wanted to talk directly with the government. They, like all Romanians, are essentially lacking in traditions when it comes to a democratic system. He refers to "their limited political sophistication." And he points out that very few of Bucharest's many hundreds of thousands of industrial workers sided with the miners.

One or two of those we spoke with echoed his remarks. One can sense that people feel isolated in many ways: "They say we are privileged and spoiled," says one grizzled man in Petroseni. "That is not true. None of them works as hard as we do. None of them risks his life on the job like we do. None of them lives as miserably as we do."

He admits that the miners have indeed been granted a six-hour workday—something unheard of in the Romanian economy. "But," he says, "they were cheated out of everything else they were promised."

Slum

With a touch of gallows humor, people in Lupeni call the residential area up on the mountainside "Dallas." It consists of gray high rises in closely spaced rows, recently built but already a slum. There is no glass in many of the windows. As unchecked decay has set in, people have been forced to abandon their apartments. Trash is blowing down the slopes, and drying laundry is flapping everywhere. A group of young men is sitting on a playground drinking wine. Poorly clothed children are playing in the slushy, rutted street:

"We left a village up in Moldova," says Mariana Mitran. "There was a lot of unemployment up there. We had heard about the high wages miners get. We thought the future was to be found here."

She and her husband and four children live in a two-room apartment measuring possibly 40 square meters. It is unbelievably run down, and the tub in the bathroom is full of water because the pressure in the community plumbing system is seldom strong enough to supply water. Mold is growing in large sheets along the walls in both rooms. The wallpaper is buckling, and there is a sour smell coming from the dark stairway.

"We have been here three years," says the miner's young wife. "During that time, everything has gotten steadily worse. We receive food that my parents send here, otherwise I don't know what we would do."

She describes her daily life as being one long, dreary wait for everything imaginable: decent provisions, clothing for the children, and everything else: "They do not have books at school. They have no paper for the children to write on."

Later we went to the market. It was a display of raw poverty. Angry old women were quarreling over chickens that are sold live from the back of a truck. There is no other kind of meat. The staples are potatoes and cabbage:

"We know it will take a great effort for Romania to become a modern country," said one of the miners who was there shopping with his wife and little boy. "I thought I was willing to pay the price, if only for my son's sake. But sometimes I wonder whether the price is too high." He shook his head: "As if there were a way back."

Army Allegedly To Liquidate Dangerous Elements

92BA0122B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 23 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Tudor Artenie: "The Army Will Fire Into the People"]

[Text] We have in our hands a military document whose contents are exceptionally serious. The Romanian Army is preparing to eliminate Romanian citizens. We reproduce here the contents of this document, excluding the sentences, figures, and dates that could leave us open to accusations of disclosing military secrets.

"Field Order No. 1. Service Secret. Copy No. 2. Sent on 08.10.09.00 received on 08.10.09.00. Cdt. cp. 1 cc. Lt Maj.... 1. Intensive irredentist and anti-Romanian actions have continued to occur in County, with the Romanian population being subjected to exceptional psychological pressure. In the Mountains, persons have been discovered who are training in martial arts and the use of hand weapons in the context of paramilitary readiness, with one such group being discovered at; those who provided such information have subsequently disappeared. SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] sources have indicated that on the morning of 10.10.1991, a group of four armed persons of Hungarian origin will conspicuously demonstrate at

"2. Cp ... cc will embark on 10.10.'91 09.30 at airport on plane, will parachute in the area centered at, and will form at D.sp.act. into five groups whose mission between 10.10 11.00 and 12.10 24.00 is to pursue along parallel directions and search the region: complete the restraint orders and the ELIMINATION (s.n.) of the dangerous elements"

The military exercise included in the present field order was performed with no apparent problems. But the contents of this military document show as clearly as possible that the Romanian Army is also being trained to fight against its own people. Even if it did involve citizens of Hungarian nationality, and even if they were training for hand-to-hand combat or even combat with hand weapons, it is not the Army's business to "eliminate" such groups. In military language, to eliminate means to kill. Citizens of Hungarian nationality are also Romanian citizens. If their behavior represents a threat to the Romanian state, intervention would be the duty of the SRI, antiterrorist services, or the police.

The language used in the field orders testifies that the Army conducts an anti-Hungarian policy, a policy that is also apparent in the military programs shown on the small screen. Normally, the word to be used should have been "enemy" (... the enemy executes...). We wonder whether the Army's combat documents for military exercises in the Jiu Valley state: "Groups of armed miners are training with picks and shovels..."?!

And we wonder why at this time, when diversionary actions have followed one another in Transylvania, the Army has conducted military exercises in plain sight of the population (parachuting into school yards, assaults on objectives located in cities with no shortage of explosives and bullets, plane and helicopter flights)? The answer is very simple: they are seeking to increase

interethnic tension in Transylvania. But has the Army reached the point where it is serving these purposes?

Editor's note: In future issues we will continue our opinion survey regarding postrevolutionary events in Covasna and Harghita counties.

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